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Somaesthetics of Music

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Philosopher Richard Shusterman's book *Body Consciousness* (2008) is the most recent and most extensive addition to Shusterman's project of "somaesthetics," an area of philosophy dealing with experiences of embodiment.[1] The subtitle, *A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics*, could be misleading. It suggests that the book might be a direct statement of Shusterman's ideas on embodiment and mindfulness, and does not reveal that the book is also, consistently, about the role of embodiment in the work of other philosophers. Shusterman's own beliefs, experiences, and arguments are present in abundance, but usually they enter the book in response to the positions of these other thinkers.

As a study of six important modern philosophers, *Body Consciousness* is virtuosic. The six—Michel Foucault, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir, Ludwig Wittgenstein, William James, and John Dewey—represent very different styles of philosophical thought. The first three come from continental traditions, poststructuralist and phenomenological. Wittgenstein is a particularly influential figure in English analytic philosophy, central to that tradition yet uncharacteristically individual and even eccentric. James and Dewey are the leading figures in the beginnings of philosophical pragmatism in the United States.

Shusterman deals deftly with all these writers, who represent not only disparate traditions of thought but different styles of philosophical writing and, therefore, different challenges for someone who summarizes and interprets them. Shusterman's own prose is lucid and somewhat impersonal. He takes great care over the attribution of positions to other writers, and savors precise conceptual distinctions and explicit argumentation. In these ways, Shusterman's prose, though not his topics nor the philosophers he discusses, is in the style of twentieth-century Anglo-American analytic philosophy. That way of writing philosophy, with its commitment to clarity and fairness, is a great achievement of twentieth-century academic life, something to treasure; it is wonderful that Shusterman and others continue this tradition while broadening its subject matter and intellectual context.

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Some of the philosophers Shusterman interprets wrote with strong political motivations—Foucault addressing the politics of sexuality and pleasure, de Beauvoir feminism, Dewey democracy. Shusterman recognizes these political issues, and always treats them intelligently when they arise, but *Body Consciousness* does not typically steer its argumentation toward political commitments.[2] Foucault has been influential partly through his insistence on treating discourses and practices historically; Shusterman says little about this aspect of Foucault's work, and Shusterman's treatment of texts regards them, most often, as articulations of philosophical positions, to assess for their present validity and usefulness, rather than as historical documents. In this relative marginalization of political and historical issues, Shusterman, again, is in accord with the mainstream of twentieth-century Anglo-American academic philosophy.

An unusual and wonderful aspect of the book is Shusterman's occasional brief turn to biography to explain the particular emphases of the philosophers he discusses; I find this especially memorable and effective in relation to Merleau-Ponty (75–76) and James (137–39).

Each of the six chapters discusses the ideas of a writer to whom issues of embodiment were philosophically central. In each case, Shusterman considers the particular role of embodiment in that philosopher's work: in what projects and arguments did issues of embodiment arise, what claims are made about embodiment, what insights and limitations are evident. And he asks, in relation to each philosopher, about the role of intentionally cultivated awareness of embodiment.

Shusterman himself strongly favors the purposeful development of bodily awareness. For the most part, the philosophers in Shusterman's book discourage practices that direct conscious attention to bodily states. However, in contrast, the book begins and ends with philosophers, Foucault and Dewey, to whom the conscious, purposeful exploration of bodily feeling was important. Shusterman endorses this emphasis, while questioning important aspects of Foucault's and Dewey's treatment and offering alternatives. For instance, he argues that Foucault's focus on transgressive sado-masochistic sex distracts attention from the mindful exploration of less extreme bodily experiences. In dealing with more negative accounts of body consciousness, for instance de Beauvoir's arguments that cultivation of bodily strength or attention to bodily feelings distracts from outward-directed political action, Shusterman responds with calm, careful argumentation that the development of bodily

awareness could contribute to the larger aims of the philosophers who reject it. Shusterman's discussions of mindful embodiment have a special authority because they draw upon his own sustained, practical study of Feldenkrais and other forms of cultivated bodily awareness. His advocacy is persistent, but also carefully unexaggerated: he never suggests that his special topic of somaesthetics should be the central topic in other philosophers' work, but only maintains that it should be granted its proper role along with other theoretical and practical considerations.

Most broadly, Shusterman urges that philosophy should not be only a discipline of reflection and argumentation, but should also contribute to a way of living; and more specifically, he identifies what he calls "somaesthetics" as a point of conjunction between philosophy and disciplines of somatic education such as the Feldenkrais Method, Alexander technique, yoga, t'ai chi and so on.

Shusterman distinguishes three aspects of somaesthetics. Analytic somaesthetics is a "descriptive and theoretical enterprise"; pragmatic somaesthetics, a prescriptive undertaking, proposes and compares "specific methods of somatic improvement." Analytic and pragmatic somaesthetics are both linguistic discourses, in that respect remaining fairly close to current understandings of philosophical and academic undertakings. To these, Shusterman adds a third, practical somaesthetics, in which one actually practices techniques of bodily care and attention. By including this third area, Shusterman refuses to confine somaesthetics to one side of the theory/practice or, indeed, body/mind oppositions.

Within pragmatic somaesthetics, Shusterman draws several distinctions. For instance, some somaesthetic practices, such as t'ai chi, are "directed primarily at the individual practitioner herself," while others, such as massage, are directed "primarily at others" (24). Again, practices may be oriented "toward external appearance or inner experience" (26). To the last two categories, which Shusterman encapsulates in the terms "representational/experiential," he adds a third, "performative," concerned with "bodily strength, skill, or health" and potentially tending toward representational or experiential aims (28–29). All these categories admit complications and blurring of boundaries. Though Shusterman introduces these categories initially in his exploration of pragmatic, prescriptive discourse, obviously these distinctions are important in the development of analytic and practical somaesthetics as well as pragmatic somaesthetics.

A somaesthetics of music?

For a musician, Shusterman's book invites an obvious question: could there be a "somaesthetics of music"? What would such a discipline be? What guidance might Shusterman's writing offer in formulating such a project? Have writers on music already done somaesthetic research, and if so, what have they contributed? I turn now to such questions. I shall focus on somaesthetics of classical instrumental music, in part because of the existence of pertinent literature; but obviously, somaesthetic issues can arise for any music.

In general, *Body Consciousness* does not focus on the main topics of modern philosophy of art nor of philosophical aesthetics, understood as a theory of beauty or aesthetic experience.[3] Shusterman understands himself to be returning to an older conception of aesthetics, no longer familiar to most of us, as found in Alexander Baumgarten's 18th-century book *Aesthetica*. This book, according to Shusterman, implies "an entire program of philosophical self-perfection in the art of living," and Shusterman hopes to work at a similar level of ambition.[4] Thus, in focusing on philosophy of beauty, or art, or, of course, music, one narrows Shusterman's project. But, to musicians, a musical application of his ideas can offer rewards.

The specific topic of music comes up just twice in Shusterman's book.[5] While evaluating Dewey's use of F. M. Alexander's work, Shusterman briefly discusses Alexander's warnings against the use of drawing, dance, and music in education. In general, Shusterman finds Alexander excessively rationalistic, and regrets the influence of his rationalism on Dewey. Shusterman quotes Alexander's unattractive racist views on the "savage" effects of dance and music, which can lead "primitive" men to a "stage of anaesthesia and complete loss of self-control" (209–210). As an example of Alexander's excessive emphasis on rationality and his resistance to spontaneous emotional experience, this is convincing. Shusterman does not try to salvage anything of interest from Alexander's comments. But Alexander's ideas are related, if remotely, to a genuinely interesting area of somaesthetic inquiry. It is not rare for people to feel that music has some kind of powerful physical effects on them, that it causes, for instance, a desire to dance, or bodily sensations associated with emotional response, such as chills or a melting feeling. A somaesthetics of music should consider such responses carefully (doing so, of course, without the racism and moralism of Alexander's presentation).

Shusterman also cites and discusses some of Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas on musical

experience. As Shusterman indicates, much of Wittgenstein's writing about bodily experience originates in rebuttal of William James's tendency to *identify* psychological phenomena with bodily feelings. Shusterman agrees with Wittgenstein that such identification is a mistake. An emotion is not identical to the bodily sensations associated with the emotion (117); knowledge of bodily position and movement is not identical to having certain bodily sensations (120); and so on. However, Shusterman observes that such negative argumentation may have an undesirable side-effect, leading to a disregard for the interest and importance of bodily sensations. Though James's theoretical reductions of psychology to bodily feelings may have been wrong, such feelings remain an important part of experience and, sometimes, a source of valuable knowledge about one's thoughts, as when awareness of a clenched hand alerts someone that they are feeling anger or anxiety.

Wittgenstein argues similarly in relation to art and aesthetic experience: art appreciation and aesthetic judgment cannot be reduced to somatic sensations, and any attempt to describe an experience of art by referring only to bodily feelings will fail (124). At the same time, bodily feelings are an important part of aesthetic experience. And, to Wittgenstein, embodiment seems to have been more important for music than for the other arts. Shusterman quotes a somewhat enigmatic passage in which Wittgenstein emphasizes the crucial role of embodiment in musical experience. According to Wittgenstein, it is difficult to see why music is sophisticated, with "its few notes and rhythms." But despite the simple surface of music, "the body which makes possible the interpretation of this manifest content has all the infinite complexity that is suggested in the external forms of other arts & which music conceals" (126). In such a moment, Wittgenstein's writing, beautiful and mysterious, tends toward the allusiveness of poetry rather than the calm clarity of his contemporary English philosophical colleagues. It is fascinating to suggest that the body somehow "makes possible the interpretation" of music's surface, and that the understanding one might gain, in other arts, through study of their "external forms" can come, in music, only through awareness of the role of the body. But what does this mean? How does the body somehow contribute, in musical experience, something akin to what the "external forms" accomplish in other arts? Does music, as Wittgenstein asserts, "conceal" the "infinite complexity" that the observable forms of other arts "suggest," by placing it in the body, or the relation between body and music? Elsewhere (in a passage not quoted by Shusterman), Wittgenstein links the ineffability of musical and poetic understanding to embodiment: "If a theme, a phrase, [*ein Thema*, *eine*

Wendung] suddenly means something to you, you don't have to be able to explain it. Just *this* gesture [*Geste*] has been made accessible to you."[6] Someone who understands a musical phrase has learned a new gesture: not, obviously, a specific physical gesture that one could demonstrate, but something *like* a bodily gesture. Again, Wittgenstein suggests that the experience of embodiment and bodily movement seems to hold an important key to musical experience.[7]

Shusterman does not really attempt to interpret the details of the passage he quotes from Wittgenstein, but he uses it as a warrant to propose, programmatically, a somaesthetic approach to music. As Shusterman writes, "our bodies are the primary instrument for making music," and "bodies are the basic, irreplaceable medium for its appreciation." Therefore, embodiment should enter into studies of musical performance and experience, and "careful attention to somaesthetic feelings"—as Shusterman asserts, without detail—should help in developing one's relation to music (126).

Beyond these hints about musical somaesthetics from Wittgenstein, Shusterman, and (however dubiously) Alexander, Shusterman's general account of the structure of somaesthetics offers an excellent model for extrapolating to a musical version. Recall that, for Shusterman, somaesthetics brings together analytic somaesthetics, pragmatic somaesthetics, and practical somaesthetics. The first two take the form of verbal discourse, one descriptive, one prescriptive, while the third is actual engagement in a bodily practice. This structure can clarify the range of work that has been done by musicians who write about embodiment, and the areas in which further exploration may take place. In the rest of this essay, I use Shusterman's categories of somaesthetics to organize comments on some recent somaesthetic studies of music. Specifically, I report on some valuable work that falls within analytic and pragmatic somaesthetics of music. In various ways, all the material I discuss proposes close relationships between embodiment and important aspects of musical meaning or content.

Analytic somaesthetics: performers' experiences.

Musicologists Suzanne Cusick and Elisabeth LeGuin have directed attention, in innovative texts well-known among musicologists, to the performer's bodily experiences in the act of performance, with specific reference to instrumental classical music.

Cusick writes in response to a conceptual model that she identifies with professional music theory and musical analysis, a model in which classical music is understood primarily

as a communication from the mind of the composer to that of the listener.[8] In such a conception, embodiment, whether of composers, listeners, or performers, drops out; Cusick associates this valorization of mind over body with misogynist tropes of gender difference. In response, she proposes careful attention to the performer's experience of her own body in the act of performance. Her main example concerns a moment in a Bach organ piece when the distribution of hands and feet leads to a period of precarious physical imbalance, followed by a restoration of balance at a certain moment. As if to validate attention to this moment, Cusick argues that the temporary loss of balance constitutes an illustration, experienced only by the organist, of the verbal text associated with Bach's piece.

This is a special example in that it focuses on aspects of the performer's experience that are not likely to be perceived by listeners. The account falls within experiential and performative somaesthetics, having to do with one's own experiences of embodiment as one performs a highly-skilled task, and not with representational somaesthetics, concerned with an address to observers. In writing about classical music, it is unusual to set aside so resolutely the perspective of an audience. Thus, in offering this account of embodied performance, Cusick proposes a bold multi-perspectival approach to classical music, adding something new that differs from the traditional music-critical emphasis on the experiences of an idealized listener. While Cusick alludes briefly to the embodied experiences of listeners as well, her essay does not try to develop this topic. Her attention to the performer's experiences, including experiences of which an audience may be unaware, firmly resists the standard music-critical assumption that the most important perspective is that of a listener.

LeGuin, like Cusick, focuses on description of a performer's bodily movements.[9] In her chapter "Cello and Bow Thinking," LeGuin describes in detail the bodily movements of a cellist playing a Boccherini sonata. There is a strong emphasis on experiential somaesthetics, the evocation of a cellist's experience of her own body in the act of performance. Boccherini was himself a cellist; very beautifully, LeGuin suggests that re-enacting Boccherini's movements leads to a kind of identification with Boccherini, and/or Boccherini's "supposition" of his future interpreter: "as I educate myself physically about the highly characterized work of this composer, these changes occur in the image, or rather the feel, of *someone else*. They delineate him with an uncanny and entirely un-visual clarity" (25). At the same time, LeGuin links her experiential observations to a more representational or audience-oriented somaesthetics, in two ways. She asserts that an audience, especially in the presence

of a live performance, will be aware, through empathy, of many of the performer's sensations, though she does not develop this point in detail (24). And she weaves her account of the performer's bodily experience together with the more sound-oriented, public-facing aspects of music that more conventional music criticism would address. For instance, the beginning of the sonata she discusses combines descent in pitch with a martial quality. Apart from issues of embodiment, this suggests "a rapidly subsiding bravado, being resisted with brief shows of rigidity." But to this, LeGuin adds her observation of the cellist's physical motion of "drawing-in toward a center." This additional somatic description modifies her original interpretation: "the retreat from the screwed-up courage of the opening is, physically speaking, pleasant, welcoming, grateful" (18). Unlike Cusick, LeGuin does not seem to be developing multiple, non-equivalent perspectives on this music; on the contrary, somatic and sonic qualities, performer and audience perspectives, seem to reinforce each other and to be, to some large extent, available for shared perception by performers and listeners.

These passages by Cusick and LeGuin indicate some possible directions for analytic somaesthetics of music with an experiential and performative focus. Questions arise for further exploration. While both writers work to integrate descriptions of performers' embodiment into broader critical descriptions of compositions, it could be that, sometimes, performers' bodily experiences point away from, rather than toward, alignment with other interpretive aspects of music, and that need not be problematic. Both writers emphasize embodied performance as a kind of communion with the composer, but this need not be the case, especially if one moves away from the specific movements that are necessary to perform the notes of the piece, considering aspects of movement where performers may have more independent choice.

Analytic somaesthetics: listeners' experiences.

Turning to a different focus, one can ask about the performer's address to the audience and the audience's own embodiment. What can a somaesthetic emphasis teach us about the experiences that performers want listeners to have? How does the address to an audience shape performers' behavior and bodily experiences? And what can one learn from somaesthetic reflection that originates in the embodied experiences of listeners?

In fact, given the conventional live performance format of classical music, in which performers move their bodies and audiences sit still and listen, it is not obvious how to begin

a somaesthetic account of listening experience. A basic initial observation, surely, is that classical music listeners do not think of listening primarily as a way of affecting their bodily states. This may seem obvious, but it is not true of all music; social dance music is praised if it makes people want to move in certain ways.

Still, some kinds of bodily sensations, such as chills or feelings of tension, are common and widely recognized in the experiences of listeners to classical music. Perhaps chills are usually experienced as a bodily response to the music; that is, a listener understands herself to feel chills that are caused by the music in some way, but does not normally attribute chills to the music itself. Tension might be like that too, sometimes; but tension may also be experienced as something shared by the listener and the music. As one might put it intuitively, tense music can make you feel tension; relaxed music can make you feel relaxation. Sometimes, qualities of bodily experience that a listener has, or perhaps imagines, are also attributed to the music heard. But sometimes, a listener experiences feelings that she does not, also, attribute to the music (she may, however, attribute different qualities to the music while having those feelings, perhaps feeling a chill and hearing a passage as creepy, surprising, or portentous).

Jerrold Levinson has written interestingly about chills and related responses.[10] Here I want to focus on the other possibility, qualities that may belong at once to both listener and music. An essay by philosopher Kendall Walton on musical tension and relaxation offers an account of such qualities.[11] Walton emphasizes that listeners themselves feel or imagine tension and relaxation, as well as attributing it to music. "I think it is clear that one typically feels tension, or something like tension, when one listens to tense music, and that one relaxes when the tension in music is released or resolved or replaced by relaxation. Often, my muscles actually do tighten in response to tension in music and then relax when the music calms down. Sometimes I have a sense of the tendency of the music to make me tense, even if it doesn't actually do so; I feel its influence. Perhaps one feels tension in imagination, or imagines feeling tension" (413). Walton wants to relate these feelings or imaginings of tension and relaxation to listeners' attributions of tension and relaxation to the music (not just to themselves). He offers the following somewhat complex account of how listeners experience tension and relaxation in music. Music causes experiences of tension and relaxation in listeners, perhaps with bodily feelings as part of the experience. Feeling this tension and relaxation, a listener may imagine *of the music* that *it* is tense or relaxed, and

imagine that her own feelings come about through contagion from the qualities present in the music. Thus, the listener's feelings, through a kind of projection, come to be experienced as qualities of music.

Though Walton's essay takes tension as its central example, a similar account could be given for other qualities that might be attributed to music and actually or imaginatively experienced by listeners. The list can expand considerably if one welcomes qualities that a listener may imagine, rather than literally feeling: for instance, when one understands music by imagining experiences of climbing, falling, circling, breaking off abruptly, continuing relentlessly, and so on.[12]

Now, what are the relations between the qualities upon which Walton's account centers, and the qualities of embodiment experienced by musical performers? There is no reason to assume that qualities of performers' experiences will match the qualities attributed to music and somatically experienced by listeners. The minimalist music of Philip Glass, for instance in the style of *Einstein on the Beach*, provides an impressive example. Musicians performing this music must play with incredible speed and precision; their performance together is a rewarding but exhausting occasion of relentlessly alert ensemble work. Meanwhile, for an audience, the result may be a relaxing wash of sound in which detail submerges; the musical repetitions can lull listeners into a trance-like or deeply relaxed state.

On the other hand, such extreme disjunction between performers' and listeners' experiences seems atypical. In any case, with most classical music, musicians surely plan their performances with empathetic awareness of the experiences that listeners are likely to have. If the somatic experiences of listeners are important, then performers must have some way of thinking about and shaping those experiences, rather than leaving them to chance. (The experiential performer-based somaesthetics of Cusick and LeGuin somewhat obscure this issue.) In general, whether ones starts from the performer's or listener's perspective, an interesting question for musical somaesthetics is the extent to which, and ways in which, performers and listeners may share embodied responses to music, despite their very different bodily relations to the musical event.

Pragmatic somaesthetics: bodily movement as a way of understanding musical gesture. An essay by music theorist Roger Graybill offers a clear example of a pragmatic somaesthetic approach.[13] Graybill, who has taught at the School of Music at the University of Texas, and at

New England Conservatory, seems to assume that his essay is primarily about the training of prospective musical performers. But nothing in the methods he describes is intrinsically more pertinent to performers than to listeners. His immediate goal is to help college-level students move from notated music to expressive, "musical" performance. But again, his methods can extend immediately to the more general task of perceiving certain aspects of music, apart from issues of notation.

Graybill, drawing in part on the pedagogical tradition of Dalcroze Eurhythmics, offers physical activities to help students become more aware of what he calls "gestural rhythm." Gestural rhythm goes beyond the patterning of attacks and durations (the aspects of rhythm visible in conventional notation) to include a sense of "dynamic flow." The sense of flow arises, not just from durations, but from "all musical dimensions, including pitch, dynamics, articulation, etc." (2). A musical gesture, according to Graybill, is "any meaningful musical unit conceived as having continuity and dynamic shape" (4). Gestures are delimited, with boundaries setting them apart from adjacent gestures; and each has "a dynamic shape of more intrinsic interest than the gestural boundaries per se" (5). According to Graybill, a dynamic shape "is fundamentally an *intensity* profile, a notion that accords well with rhythm as a dynamic ebb and flow. Defined thus broadly, a dynamic shape can arise from any musical element (or combination of elements) that is able to produce varying degrees of intensity, such as dynamics (i. e. loud, soft); timbre; articulation; pitch contour; or durational pattern" (5). Within a gesture, there will be a "primary point of accent," "a point of focus that helps to shape" the continuity of the gesture (8). Gesture and meter coexist and interact, and while "one of the goals of teaching rhythm as gesture is to outgrow an overly metrical approach to rhythm" (15), it is also important for students to feel the gestural qualities of metrical patterns themselves.

Such gestures, and their intensity profiles, are the aspects of music to which Graybill wants to sensitize his students. The essay remains at a level of elementary musical phenomena—basic meters and brief single-line patterns, showing beginning stages of musicianship training. Graybill's teaching methods include various kinds of bodily movement, performed by the students, that reflect aspects of the music. "While gestural fluidity may be difficult to define, its character can be directly *experienced* through physical gesture" (16). The bodily movements are simple, among them the beat patterns used by conductors (18); clapping with careful attention to the gradual separation of the hands

between claps (29); stepping to show rhythmic attacks, again with careful attention to motion between steps (30); or circular arm movements to show both regular meter and the fluctuations of speed in attack rhythms (30–31). Graybill wants students to perform these movements with careful attention to what they are doing and how it feels to do it. In a conducting pattern, for instance, one should feel the rising motion of the arm, against gravity, as it gathers energy; the release of energy, corresponding to a metric strong point, as the arm drops to its lowest point, assisted by gravity; and the comparatively neutral lateral motion as the arm maintains the beat pattern until its next rise.

Several points emerge in relation to the analytic somaesthetics that I discussed earlier. Graybill's pedagogy of musical gesture separates music students from their familiar media of musical production – instruments and even conventional vocal performance—and asks them to use their bodies in different ways, not with the goal of controlling musical media to produce sound but purely to create bodily counterparts to qualities of the music. There is an interesting gap between the experiential somaesthetics of Cusick and LeGuin, and the different experiential somaesthetics that Graybill deploys.

Bodily activities, of the sort Graybill recommends, themselves constitute innovative, nonstandard practices in relation to music. But it does not seem that they are meant to create new or nonstandard musical perceptions, experienced only by Graybill's students and others who follow his practices. Specific bodily movements increase sensitivity to certain qualities of music; those qualities are presumably available for perception independently of any specific somatic exercises that Graybill describes.

Because Graybill's pedagogy addresses qualities that can be perceived through listening to music, it does not reflect a specific performance orientation as opposed to a listening orientation. I understand it as a way of removing performers from the specific somatic demands of performance, and thereby allowing them to explore a different range of somatically-related musical qualities that can be shared between performers and their audiences.

In offering types of embodied movement as tools for understanding musical qualities, Graybill gives specificity to the notion of musical gesture, but through analogy and implication rather than theoretical articulation. Like Wittgenstein, he does not believe that one must be able to explain verbally what one understands in understanding a musical gesture. But he offers an alternative method, beyond performance or contemplation, in which

the body gives interpretive access to the musical content. Again, "while gestural fluidity may be difficult to define, its character can be directly *experienced* through physical gesture" (16).

Defining dynamic shape in terms of the patterning of intensity, Graybill comes tantalizingly close to Walton's emphasis on tension and relaxation. If tension and intensity are not identical concepts, nonetheless the verbal similarity indicates a close kinship. Again, Graybill's pragmatic approach, asking students to feel certain qualities in their own bodies in order to recognize related qualities in music, has an intriguingly close relation to Walton's analytical position, according to which some important musical qualities are felt or imagined somatically by listeners and projected onto the music they hear.

Alexandra Pierce's book on musical performance and bodily movement, new around the same time as *Body Consciousness*, has many similarities to Graybill's work, as well as important differences.[14] As a particularly rich, ambitious contribution to somaesthetics of music, it deserves thorough study by anyone engaged in this area. Here I will make only a few brief points about it. Like Graybill, Pierce offers bodily activities and experiences as counterparts for musical qualities. She identifies "ten musical elements with a distinct kinetic quality that can be vitalized by movement," and her list is impressively comprehensive, including melodic, harmony, and rhythmic aspects, phrase, climax, juncture, and more (3–4). The studies in Pierce's book include relatively basic phenomena such as meter, but she often moves to more sophisticated levels of interpretive advice, appropriate for accomplished performers. At times, having arrived at a type of somatic movement that enhances the understanding of a musical passage, she suggests that the performer may try to bring aspects of these pedagogically valuable bodily movements into the actual embodied act of performance. Nonetheless, as with Graybill's pedagogy, Pierce's work generally seems as apposite for listeners as for performers.

Clearly, even within the somewhat narrow range of somaesthetics for classical music, there is plenty to think about. Another area of study would be the actual actions, the practical somaesthetics, that take place whenever there are music lessons or dance lessons. Sometimes this teaching has a conscious theoretical component (as, for instance, when a teacher passes on the Taubman Method of piano technique); but often there is little articulate theory, just the passing on from teacher to student of musical and somatic traditions. Such lessons have received little direct study, though ethnomusicologist Tomie Hahn has recently given a beautiful model (in relation to a tradition remote from Western classical music) for study of

the transmission of embodied knowledge.[15]

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Notes

[1] Earlier explorations appeared in *Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art*, second edition (Lahman: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000) and *Performing Live: Aesthetic Alternatives for the End of Art* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).
[2] In *Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life* (New York: Routledge, 1997) Shusterman wrote about political theory, especially with regard to democracy.
[3] Many of Shusterman's other publications make distinguished contributions to the study of art and aesthetic experience; but somaesthetics is a different and broader project.
[4] *Pragmatist Aesthetics*, p. 263.
[5] Shusterman has written on rap and country music, in *Performing Live*, but not from a somaesthetic perspective.
[6] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, transl. G. E. M. Anscombe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 28.
[7] References to musical "gesture," with various meanings and various relations to embodiment, are not rare in music criticism. See, for instance, Wye Jamison Allanbrook, *Rhythmic Gesture in Mozart: Le Nozze de Figaro and Don Giovanni* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), or Anthony Gritten and Elaine King, eds., *Music and Gesture* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006).
[8] Suzanne G. Cusick, "Feminist Theory, Music Theory, and the Mind/Body Problem." *Perspectives of New Music* 32: 1 (1994), pp. 8–27.
[9] Elisabeth LeGuin, *Boccherini's Body: An Essay in Carnal Musicology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).
[10] Jerrold Levinson, "Musical Chills," in *Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 220–236.
[11] Kendall Walton, "Projectivism, Empathy, and Musical Tension." *Philosophical Topics* 26: 1 & 2 (1999), pp. 407–440.
[12] However, it is not clear that such phenomena should receive the same account as cases where a listener's actual physical sensation is projected on to the music.
[13] Roger Graybill, "Toward a Pedagogy of Gestural Rhythm." *Journal of Music Theory Pedagogy* 4:1 (1990), pp. 1–50.
[14] Alexandra Pierce, *Deepening Musical Performance through Movement: The Theory and Practice of Embodied Interpretation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).
[15] Tomie Hahn, *Sensational Knowledge: Embodying Culture through Japanese Dance* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2007).

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