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Keynote Address



Social Theory, and Music and Music Education as Praxis

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When an art product once attains classic status, it somehow becomes isolated from the human conditions under which it was brought into being and from the human consequences it engenders in actual life-experience. When artistic objects are separated from both conditions of origin and operation in experience a wall is built around them that renders almost opaque their general significance . . . Art is remitted to a separate realm, where it is cut off from that association with the materials and aims of every other form of human effort, undergoing, and achievement. (John Dewey 1980 [1934], 3)

Introduction

The idea of praxis, and thus the idea of music as praxis, is not widely known in the fields of music and music education. Since Ancient Greece, and thus long before the social sciences as we know them were born, music and music education have been discussed almost exclusively in philosophical terms. With the 18th century Enlightenment, the *aestheticization*¹ of art and music by philosophy, and its resulting *aesthetic vocabulary* and *music-appreciation-as-connoisseurship* paradigm of ‘refined taste’, has defined the problematic² of music and musical value in the mentalist terms of Cartesian rationalism: for example, dualisms of intrinsic/extrinsic, mind/body, pure/practical, Fine/applied arts, and so on.³ Furthermore, with this aestheticization of music has come what sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls the “sacralization” of music and art—the belief that “the world of art [and music!] is as contrary to the world of everyday life as the sacred is to the profane” (Bourdieu 1993, 236). Concerning the aesthetic theorists who over time have created this condition, philosopher of art Jean-Marie Schaeffer writes:

[W]e are told that art is an ecstatic knowledge, the revelation of ultimate truths inaccessible to profane cognitive activities; or that it is a transcendental experience that founds man’s being-in-the-world, or again that it is the presentation of the unrepresentable, the event or occurrence of Being; and so on. The thesis, in all its forms and formulations, . . . implies a sacralization of art, which is contrasted, as an ontological mode of knowledge, to other human activities, which are seen as alienated, deficient, or inauthentic. What some of its most enthusiastic current exponents do not know, or pretend not to know, is that this thesis also presupposes a theory of Being: if art is ecstatic knowledge, this is so because there are two kinds of reality, the apparent one to which we have access through our senses and reasoning intellect, and the hidden one that reveals itself only to art (and perhaps to philosophy). (Schaeffer 2000, 6)

As a result, Schaeffer notes, an entire discourse concerning music and art has arisen in strictly *philosophical terms*, the task of which

is to provide a philosophical legitimation of the ontological cognitive function of art. What this amounts to is the claim that the arts and art works have to legitimate themselves philosophically. They can do so, however, only when they are in conformity with their postulated philosophical ‘essence’: whence precisely the necessity for artists to envisage their works as answers to the question, “What is art?”—understood as a question about its legitimacy. Thus the circle is completed: the search for the essence is fact a search for philosophical legitimacy. (Schaeffer 2000, 6-7).

The intellectualizing involved with such philosophical legitimacy, leads Christopher Small to conclude concerning a history of aesthetics he was asked to review:

The trouble was that most it bore very little relation to anything I recognized in my own musical experience, as listener, or as performer, or as a composer. In the first place, all the writers deal exclusively with what we today would call the western high classical tradition And in the second place, the theories they developed were all terribly abstract and complicated I could not make myself believe that so universal, and so concrete a human practice as music should need such complicated and abstract explanations. (Small 1997, 1)

Nonetheless, musicians and music teachers typically take for granted as sacrosanct the noble sounding, metaphysical, even spiritual profundity of music hypothesized by mainstream aesthetic philosophies. Thus accounts of music as praxis can seem too mundane or even sacrilegious, and meaningful discourse in any other ‘terms’ than aesthetic is almost impossible.

Social theory⁴ consistently provides just such analyses of music—accounts not rooted in the philosophical legitimations or vocabulary of speculative aesthetic theory. Despite overwhelming empirical evidence, for example, from recent sociology of music, leading music education philosophers and music education as a *field* have nonetheless either benignly ignored or actively rejected social theory as a basis for understanding and advancing the role and purpose of music in schools and society. Among the reasons for this is that in Bourdieu’s theory of practice⁵ a “field” is, as summarized by a leading Bourdieu scholar, a “social arena within which struggles or manoeuvres take place over specific resources or stakes and access to them” (Jenkins 1992, 84).⁶ Central to any field of practice, then, are already existing and taken-for-granted paradigms and their related ‘terms’ of understanding. These old ‘terms’ and the “social positions” (Jenkins 1992, 85) they represent a struggle against new ‘terms’ and the challenges they present to vested interests and power relations in the field.⁷ This is not, however, simply a turf-battle over *terms* but, rather, that different terminology defines

the turf itself—the field⁸ and its concerns, values, operations—differently and thus governs its internal dynamics of power (Foucault 1972).

In considering the differences between aesthetic and social ‘terms’ for understanding music and music education, it is notable that orthodox aesthetic philosophy involves *speculative theory* arrived at by rational analysis.⁹ In particular, as Schaeffer stresses, “the speculative theory of Art . . . is a *speculative* theory because in the diverse forms it assumes in the course of time, it is always deduced from a general metaphysics . . . that provides its legitimation” (2000, 7; italics in original). The vagueness and thus endless diversity of metaphysical premises used to account for and legitimate art and music account for the proliferation of aesthetic theories, their lofty sounding claims, and their typically conflicting and thus confusing ‘positions’ within philosophy as a field. For example, echoing Small’s appraisal given above, one philosopher complains,

aesthetic theory often seems false to our experience of art Recently, such inadequacy to our experience of art has been evident; a result, I believe, partly of aestheticians’ preoccupation with what it is to treat something ‘aesthetically’, and partly from a concentration on works of art in isolation from the circumstances in which they are actually created or appreciated. (Proudfoot 1988, 850).

Music theorists typically accept this aesthetic paradigm uncritically and thus treat musical ‘works’ as autonomous structures to be analyzed for ‘inner’ structure. This assumption is passed on, equally uncritically, to every musician who has taken required music theory courses. However, as leading musicologist Joseph Kerman has pointed out, as a result of this preoccupation with structure comes

the neglect of other vital matters—not only the whole historical complex . . . , but also everything else that makes music affective, moving, emotional, expressive. By removing the bare score from its context in order to examine it as an autonomous organism, the analyst removes that organism from the ecology that sustains it. It scarcely seems possible in this day and age to ignore the fact of that sustenance. (1985, 73)

Social accounts of music as praxis, in contrast, are predicated precisely *on* the “ecology” that sustains music—as Proudfoot put it, “the circumstances” in which music is “actually created or appreciated.” And this includes not just the historical context, but also present contexts of use—in other words, it focuses on the various down to earth acts of what Christopher Small has called “musicking” (Small 1998). Thus, on the basis of empirical study of such musicking, social theory accounts for the values and meaning that music affords individuals and society. This empirical

grounding in *actual musical praxis*, then, promotes a remarkable agreement among contemporary social theories of music and musical value.

Here I hope to provide an account of music as praxis that dispels at least some of the *obscurum per obscurius*¹⁰ visited on the question of the value and role of music and music education by philosophers, and by theorists and musicologists who take aesthetic theory for granted. First I will survey the idea of praxis and briefly trace the aestheticization of music; then I will present an examination of music as praxis and sketch some implications of that analysis for music education.

Praxis, Aisthesis and the Aestheticization of Art

The idea of praxis¹¹ first arises in classical antiquity as a critique of the politics of the Sophists. It finds its first extended treatment in the ethics of Aristotle who distinguishes between three different kinds of knowledge.¹² The first, *theoria*, was ‘pure’ knowledge contemplated for its own sake. Aristotle hypothesized reason to be the essence of what it means to be human and thus the “good life” was lived in accord with reason. Unlike Plato, Aristotle also acknowledged “an independent non-intellectual cognitive value to the senses” (Osborne 2000b, 2) called *aisthesis*. However, because this “judgement of sense” (Summers 1987) dwelled on sensory particulars rather than abstract absolutes and involved “pleasurable perception” of an emotional nature (Summers 1987, 62-63), the so-called ‘faculty’ of reason was held to be higher than sensory knowledge. Thus *aisthesis* was not accorded rational status and, correspondingly, was philosophically devalued. Contemporary neo-Kantian and analytic aesthetic theories are direct descendants of this ancient prejudice for reason and intellect over the senses and the body and for art and music as sources of purely contemplative understanding.

Body-based knowledge did play a role in *techne*, the second of Aristotle’s types of knowledge. *Techne* involved the skill and craft know-how that, at the time, included what today we call the arts—all of which, however, were praxial rather than contemplated for their own sake as *theoria*. *Techne* was characterized by *poiesis*, the ‘making’ of things, like pots. Such know-how involved impersonal, rule- or custom-governed technical and physical skills.¹³ Mistakes of technique such as a poorly centered pot were simply discarded and the artisan simply corrected the problem and proceeded with no more notice than of the time lost.

Praxis, in contrast, served humans and thus it was governed by the important differences between particular humans (or groups) and their unique needs. This need for diagnosis of particulars entailed an ethical dimension called *phronesis* that stressed, first of all, the prudence needed to ‘care-fully’ serve the infinite variability of human needs by producing ‘right results’ and by ‘doing no harm’. Praxial knowledge is thus highly *individualized* since it results from an agent’s accumulated experience with the always situated and variable particulars of this or that individual or group. Bourdieu describes such knowledge as a ‘feel’ or ‘sense’ for the game (Bourdieu 1990, 66, 80, 82, 94, 102; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 120-121) that is comparable to the strategic knowledge and dispositions athletes get simply from playing a game.¹⁴ Praxial knowledge is also *self-actualizing*; important dimensions of Self arise according to the important differences of personal style and unique results that distinguish the praxis of different agents—say, between different concert artists.

Praxis thus involves a practical feel and a personal style of being both pragmatically ‘sensible’ (i.e., tacit knowing that is both embodied and ‘practical’) and ethically prudent in a field of action. A field of praxis can involve a certain ‘common sense’ to the degree that there are basic similarities between the types of problems addressed by the field and between practitioners or agents. Nonetheless, there can be no ‘common practice’ because practical differences between situations and those served demand diagnostic judgment and adjustment; thus there will be ethical ‘standards of care’ but no ‘standard praxis’! Because such judgment arises in connection with the untidy empirical conditions and criteria of real world needs, however, it is *practical*, not universal; and the prejudice for rationality took precedence for Aristotle and his successors over the particulars of sense-based knowledge and experience.¹⁵ Thus, mind and reason were enshrined as the fundamental prejudice of philosophy and, hence, of what would eventually become today’s analytic and neo-Kantian aesthetic philosophy.¹⁶

Art and music were of course produced, used, and enjoyed for the next 1800 years but decidedly as praxis, not for disinterested contemplation. With the Renaissance, however, the psychological language of inward sensibility and affect that had accompanied theoretical discussions of *aisthesis* since Aristotle slowly began to be applied specifically to art and music (Summers 1987, 319-20). This was given impetus, in the mid-18th century, by Alexander Baumgarten’s attempt (in his *Aesthetica* of 1750) to validate *aisthesis* more in

terms favored by the resolute rationalism of the Enlightenment. Baumgarten thus sought to rationalize and intellectualize sensory knowledge and pleasure (Summers 1987, 195-197; Menke 2000, 40) as autonomous.¹⁷

Aesthetica immediately elicited philosophical criticism: Kant “rejected Baumgarten’s notion of a pure sensory knowledge” (Osborne 2000b, 3) and, from the first, “declarations of the impropriety of the word ‘aesthetic’ accompanied the rise of aesthetic thought itself” (Rancière 2000, 18). Thus, “August W. Schlegel’s *Lessons in Aesthetics* . . . opens with the assertion that it is time to get rid of this notion of aesthetics, a veritable *qualitas occulta*” and, “the word ‘aesthetics,’ Hegel said, is improper to designate the philosophy of beautiful art” (Rancière 2000, 18). Thus, as Proudfoot’s quotation above shows, aesthetic theory even today is still widely disputed in the field of philosophy *as* philosophy.

Nonetheless Kant’s famous *Critique of Judgment* (1790), though largely an account of beauty in *nature*, ultimately spawned aesthetic theories of *art* in which the alchemy of aestheticization transformed previously ‘base’ sensations into ideal aesthetic Beauty.¹⁸ In particular, music came to be venerated as the paragon of all the arts: By virtue of its abstractness and disconnection from worldly reference, during the heyday of Romanticism it was held to be the most pure and disinterested art. In supposedly existing to be contemplated for its own sake, then, it served as a model for the abstract art and the “art-for-art’s-sake” movement of late 19th and early 20th century modernism in the visual arts (Regelski 1970).

Despite the controversy over the term and its use, the die was set in favor of aesthetic accounts of music and musical value and a proliferation of competing aesthetic theories appeared. The subsequent rationalization of music traced by sociologist Max Weber’s classic study of *The Rational and Social Foundations of Music* (Weber 1958) quickly institutionalized both an aesthetic hierarchy and aesthetic terms for musical and artistic praxis.¹⁹ It is this “modernist” aesthetic ideal—though still in a proliferating abundance of competing versions—that nonetheless reigns as the taken-for-granted paradigm within the fields of Classical music and music education.

Praxis and Social Theory

At the same time the 19th century was rationalizing and aestheticizing music and art, Karl Marx re-introduced the idea of praxis and transformed it in terms of social, economic, and political theory (Joas 1993, 158; Bernstein 1971²⁰). As a result, Marx created one of the

classical theories of social thought—along with those of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber (Elliott & Ray 2003, xi; Ritzer 1992, 41-75) and it continues to exert a major influence on 20th century social theory.

Marxism still provides an important general theory of society that combines economics, politics, and sociology, and offers a critical reflection on basic dimensions of society [I]t is impossible to understand twentieth-century philosophy, economics, politics, and sociology without a thorough grounding in Marxist theory. Marxism has also had an important contribution to make to the evolution of feminism, psychoanalysis, and cultural studies. Marxism will continue to be important because it provides at least one possibility of combining moral analysis with social science, and because it profoundly questions the division between facts and values. (Elliott and Ray 2001, 6-7)

In his transformation of the Greek idea of praxis, Marx was influenced by Hegel's concept of *Geist*—an elusive concept of the human 'spirit' that combines 'universal reason' with 'action'. For Hegel, "*Geist* is what it does, and man *is* what he does" (Bernstein 1971, 22). *Geist* in action is praxis, and theory reflects on action and becomes the rational and guiding basis of praxis. Through Marx these themes of praxis as action in the world and as self-reflection on the results of such action became central in sociology and social theory.

Praxis is human engagement with the world for Marx; as a human's way of Being-in-the-world and changing it, praxis is the fundamental attribute of being human. "Consequently," as Bernstein summarizes, for Marx "the very nature or character of a man is determined by what he does or his *praxis*, and his products are concrete embodiments of this activity" (Bernstein 1971, 44). Furthermore, praxis is the means by which human needs, however unconsciously apprehended or passionately held, are realized (53), and praxis is thus the means by which the world is improved (54-55). For Marx, praxis "turns out to be the key for understanding the full range of man's developing cognitive activities" (73), and it refers not just to labor, work, or job²¹ but all kinds of *personal and social action*, everyday and ubiquitous as well as mindful and extraordinary.²² Society, accordingly, is itself constituted in important ways through the various practices of individuals (Bauman 1999).

Marx thus first formulated the two central problems of sociology: the issue of human *action* (in other words, praxis), and the nature of *society* (in other words, social order among individuals). The relation of the individual to society remains a fundamental concern of sociologists. Some, like Durkheim, have stressed the objectivity of social structures while others, like Weber, have stressed subjective meanings of individuals. However, many contemporary theorists attempt to account for a two-way or dialectical relationship between

society and the individual, both of which are studied in terms of their objective manifestations *and* their subjective meanings relative to individuals and history, and the situatedness of both. At the heart of such considerations is the fundamental issue of praxis studied by *practice theory* (e.g., Schatzki et al., 2001) as the dialectical means by which individuals create, at the same time as they are created by, society—i.e., the “objectivity of the subjective” as Bourdieu calls it (1990, 30-51 and 135-141).

Praxis and Practical Judgment: The Individual and Society

Practice theory has no uniform “practice approach” (Schatzki et al., 2001, 2) or standard model of praxis precisely because different practice theorists study different practices in different ways. However, several key themes can be useful in summarizing important conditions of praxis (based on Grundy 1987, 104-05; see also Jenkins 1992, 66-102):

1. Praxis consists of action and reflection on the tangible results of that action. Such reflection on the results of praxis newly informs the personal theory and praxial knowledge that, in turn, guides future praxis—and so on, in a never-ending spiral.
2. Praxis arises in the real world from concrete, present and meaningful situations that elicit action.
3. Praxis takes place in terms of the historically and presently situated social or cultural world and is a form of reciprocal interaction with that world.
4. The social world in which praxis takes place is itself constructed (or reconstructed) by praxis; it is not the natural world.
5. Meaning, too, is socially constructed, not *a priori* and absolute.²³

Praxis, then, is a domain of *practical* ‘judgments’,²⁴ occasioned, to begin with, by tangible ‘situations’ offering unique options and possibilities.²⁵ This *situatedness* of praxis includes not only the present environment but, as importantly, the needs, goods and goals—viz., the intentionality or purposiveness—at stake. These are conditioned both by society and by the particular possibilities at stake as understood and appropriated by the agent(s). This guiding intentionality can involve goods and goals that range from everyday to extraordinary (see, e.g., Kilpinen 2000, 73, 86).

Practical judgments are thus not ‘merely relative’ to the situation: the entire process is authorized in terms of what Durkheim called the “social facts” (see Ritzer 1992, 17-18 and *passim*) that serve as the conditioning background of praxis, and by the specific needs

occasioning the praxis of the moment. Claims concerning values, knowledge, and meaning are therefore warranted by *empirical criteria* and *situated consequences*, not by abstract philosophical absolutes hypothesized *a priori* as universally and eternally True, Good, or Beautiful. The goods and goals that characterize social and cultural practices, then, are not merely what an individual prefers or finds agreeable. The purposes of praxis arise, instead, from situated engagement with social conditions, contexts, and customs in terms of which action is undertaken to begin with. This association of praxis with the ‘goodness’ or ‘rightness’ of certain goals connected with the “good life” remains a theme of praxis theory in all social fields, including education (Grundy 1987; Dunne 1993). The ‘practical’ wisdom of praxis, then, is *pragmatic* and should not be confused with ideas of mere ‘practicability’ that are associated with unprincipled expediency or self-indulgence.

Furthermore, simple behaviors or customs such as throwing a ball or praying only become praxis through the total ensemble of factors that are, respectively, the practices of “baseball” and “religion.” Praxis always involves, then, a range of *interconnected actions*. Correspondingly, no praxis exists in isolation as autonomous; rather, any praxis depends on, is conditioned by, or is nested within what a leading practice theorist calls “the total nexus of interconnected human practices” (Schatzki et al., 2001, 2)—in other words, in social life *tout ensemble*. It is in this sense that, as Michel de Certeau (1988) shows, “everyday life” itself is a comprehensive praxis that is intriguingly complex and obviously significant.

Habitus and the “Music World”

“Music” is a *field* of praxis within the nexus of other social practices. It consists of an infinite multiplicity of musics, each sub-field defined by and defining of its own goods and goals, each socially positioning itself within the field as advantageously as possible, yet accounting collectively for what can be called the “music world”²⁶ of a particular society or culture and its *generative idea* of “music”—what Durkheim called a socially created “category of cognition.”²⁷ As such a category, a “music world” is itself *socially created* by and in terms of the set of historical and socially situated conditions that account for the particular nature, conditions, importance, goods, and purposes associated with the generative idea of “music” as actualized within what Bourdieu calls *habitus*—the shared structures, patterns, dispositions, ‘tastes’, habits, norms, values, and traditions of a particular society or community of likeminded agents (see, e.g., Bourdieu 1990, 52-65; 1993, 64-73.)²⁸

There are many “music worlds,” typically quite local or regional (Unterberger’s 1999 “rough guide” identifies 21 in the US²⁹), according to the different reality and life-world produced by different habitus.³⁰ Furthermore, since humans are both *art creating* and *art created* beings, not only do they self-actualize by creating and interacting with art and music of various kinds, but art and music at the same time help create (and modify) habitus. Thus “*sociation*” (Simmel 1950)—which is to say, the relations between individuals, between individuals and social structures, and between social structures—is a fundamental ingredient of music and its personal and social significance.

As a result, no musical practice is autonomous,³¹ and the meaning or processual “logic” (in Bourdieu’s 1990 sense) of any music is also not autonomous and ‘of’ or ‘for’ itself, as typical aesthetic theories speculate (see Krims 1998). Concerning language praxis, Wittgenstein demonstrated that meaning is not ‘in’ word definitions but arises in situated instances of their use. Ethnomethodologists in sociology have similarly stressed the importance of the countless “indexical expressions” involved in typical social communication—expressions that “can only be tacitly understood in the concrete situation by the particular people involved” (Collins & Makowsky 1993, 244). For the same reasons, musical meaning is neither immanent nor transcendently ‘in’ musical works but is *situated in use*—by praxis, in action—according to the conditions and criteria of the particular praxis.

As Bourdieu cautions, then, “one has to escape” from treating practices “as realities already constituted”—for example, he specifically observes, from treating music as simply “the playing of scores” as though they are autonomous carriers of set meanings. Bourdieu continues: “To do this, one has to return to practice” and “situate oneself within ‘real activity as such’, that is in the practical relation to the world” (1990, 52)—viz., in the practical matrix of relations which generates the thoughts, perceptions, meanings, and actions “whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions” of the habitus, the field, and the praxis involved (1990, 55). Practices, then, can “only be accounted for by relating the social conditions in which the *habitus* that generated them was constituted” and “to the social conditions in which it is implemented” (1990, 56) in the specific, *present* moment as praxis.³² In sum, then, habitus “is constituted in practice and is *always oriented towards practical functions*” (1990, 52; italics added).

This reinsertion of a practice such as music back into the system of social relations and needs that produced and sustains it and to which it contributes exposes the myth and

ideology (Krimms 1998) of what Bourdieu calls “the pure gaze” of disinterested contemplation for its own sake (1993, 254-66). It also properly accounts for what he describes as “the practical functions that symbolic systems perform” (1990, 295)—namely the *functional dimensions of music* specifically downplayed by the ‘purposiveness without purpose’ and “pure gaze” of neo-Kantian aesthetic theories of ideal, universal Beauty. However, and again, meaning is not *arbitrarily* relative to such practical functions: rather, arbitrariness is in fact overcome by praxis because the music on any given occasion is conditioned, first, by the habitus; then according to the traditions and norms of the field and the particular musical praxis involved and its musicianship demands; and, finally, by the specific goods and goals that occasion it for a person or group (Bourdieu 1993, 305³³). The situatedness of musicking, then, is saturated with all kinds and degrees of social authority and warrants.

In consequence, as John Shepherd writes, “the significance of music is neither arbitrary nor immanent”; rather, “music’s characteristics are . . . guiding, shaping, and facilitating” influences, but “they are not determining” of music’s meaning (Shepherd 2002, 9). Musical meaning is thus grounded in the “objectivity of subjectivity” already mentioned in connection with Bourdieu. The *facticity* of music, hence, is not a matter of pre-determined essences residing in notated ‘works’³⁴ but of offering a range of possibilities—of ‘affordances’—the ‘appropriation’ of which is always conditioned by the particular criteria—the goods and goals—presently at stake for the individual or group.

Concerning the idea of *affordances*, DeNora (2000, 38-41) explains, “objects ‘afford’ actors certain things; a ball, for example, affords rolling, bouncing and kicking in a way that a cube of the same size, texture and weight would not”(39). Furthermore, “objects afford things independently of how users appropriate them” (40) and thus possess objective properties. Such affordances, however, are *appropriated*—i.e., ‘taken’—*differently* by different listeners. Thus, music properties that listeners attend to—and how and why—vary according to situated conditions, contexts and criteria, and according to predispositions of habitus, personal (non-musical) history, formal education, musical background (formal and informal), interests, present needs, and the like. As we shall see in more detail below concerning the social theory of John Searle, then, *objective properties* are appropriated differently according to *observer-relative variables*.

This process is reinforced by the idea from psychology of “attentive qualities”; i.e., qualities that are *intensive* in ways that elicit *attention*. In music, affordances are attentive or

‘stand out’ according to variables influencing the “selective attention” of different listeners.³⁵ For example, the oboe part is naturally more attentive for an oboist; most salient for a theorist will be affordances influenced by training; and composers may well listen ‘compositionally’ in ways that even other musicians do not or cannot. Likewise, what ordinary listeners find attentive varies according to their personal and musical backgrounds, interests, and the literature at stake. Some audience members may attend closely to the spiritual connotations of a sacred choral text because of their personal religious sentiments (though they do not usually consider a “concert” as “worship”) while for others a text—sacred or otherwise—is secondary to other attentive variables and not the source of focal attention. Similarly, ordinary listeners do not generally attend to technical details that are attentive for performers (or critics) in the audience,³⁶ such as matters of phrasing, tempi, etc., and, instead, more typically attend to the predominant affordances and the overall impression, which more often than not they experience and describe in affective rather than musician’s terms.

Fundamental differences between habitus often result in incommensurable meanings and opaqueness between the musical practices of different societies, but also between musics that contend within the field of music in pluralistic societies. Similarly, differences between people in the same society who do not share the same musical habitus also lead them to appropriate musical affordances in considerably different ways and for considerably different purposes.³⁷

Praxis and the Body

Because any praxis takes ‘form’ as a tangible ‘doing’, praxis involves *embodied* knowledge and experience (Bourdieu 1990, 66-79).³⁸ With the aestheticization of music, however, came what Bourdieu describes as a “ ‘disengagement’ of the body” (1990, 73)³⁹ by which musical meaning became increasingly mentalist and rational—and therefore subject to the “*intellectualist bias* which entices us to construe the world as a *spectacle*, as a set of significations to be interpreted rather than as concrete problems to be solved practically,” as Bourdieu puts it (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 39; italics his). In contrast to the separation between mind and body that serves as the governing condition of the disinterested aesthetic contemplation of the “pure gaze,” practice theorists stress the engagement and important contribution of the human body (Schatzki et al., 2-3, 7-9)—what DeNora calls “a conception

of the ‘body’ as a socialized entity” that focuses “on what the body may become as it is situated within different contexts” (2000, 75), such as musical.

Such embodiment applies not just to performing music, but also to listening (see Dura 1998). First of all, the entire body is implicated in a way that is not the case with the other senses. Sound in general—and music in particular—is directly ‘felt’ throughout the extended body, including skin and viscera.⁴⁰ The notion of an ideal aesthetic common ground shared by different Arts and the consequent aesthetic *universalizing* of “feelings” and “emotions,” however, results in what Harry Broudy calls “aesthetic emotion” or “intellectual emotion” that is, he writes, “not the real thing somehow” (Broudy 1991, 81).⁴¹ As a result, such anesthetized emotions are experienced as cognitive abstractions, not by ‘minding the body’, so to speak (see Johnson 1987).

The emotional life that concerns most orthodox aestheticians is also understood to be *uniform* and *non-discursive*; thus it is assumed that the ‘form’ or ‘structure’ of this inner life can be abstracted and cognitively invoked by music for disembodied, rational contemplation. However, what is experienced as (or ‘triggers’) “emotion” in one society is not necessarily experienced *as* “emotion” by another, or not as the *same* “emotion,” or in the same *way* (Kövecses 2000, 187). Furthermore, emotions are not independent of language since “emotion language . . . can define and even create emotional experiences for us ” (2).

This “embodied cultural prototype” view of recent cognitive linguistics thus demonstrates that “cultural and social factors influence and shape emotional experience” (Kövecses 2000, 14) in ways that challenge the universality of presentational, symbolic forms of ‘feeling’ or ‘emotion’ hypothesized by mainstream aesthetic theories. Among such sociocultural factors are many *non-musical* auditory experiences (e.g., of nature, from society) that are the bodily basis of responding to sound at all—and, even then, only in culturally specific ways. Psychological case studies of musical use in “ ‘naturalistic’ settings” show, furthermore, that most listening takes place in connection with a vast array of associated social practices (DeNora 2000, 46-47 and *passim*) that involve more of the body than just the ears.⁴² And, of course, dance and ordinary, everyday bodily movements in general all influence the bodily bases of listening.

Rules and Norms of Praxis

Traditions and norms are widely discussed in practice theory (Schatzki et al., 9-10). *Norms*, for example, provide certain expectations, such as that a dance will have danceable music and that a jazz concert will not involve dancing. However, such general expectations are only background conditions for the *creative aspect of musical praxis* that we most value—the indeterminacy that produces unique, creative, anomalous, or otherwise interesting results on each occasion.⁴³ This non-routine, indeterminate dimension of any praxis—what Bourdieu calls its “regulated improvisation” (1990, 57)—promotes our interest, but also explains why and how practices evolve.

Norms that instead become determinate formulae, unthinking routines, and handed down, static traditions-for-their-own-sake limit praxis to evocations of past meanings rather than generating the creative possibilities that result from ‘living traditions’, traditional practices that *do* evolve—a distinction that leads to important differences between ‘museum’ and ‘living’ arts (see, McMullen 1968, 48-51). However, when stagnant traditions dominate large-scale social institutions (such as schools or music education), the praxial creativity, improvisation, and innovation needed to accommodate social change and thus to promote pragmatic effectiveness are typically retarded, prevented, or negated. When such ‘normal’ or taken for granted practices—local or large-scale—are passed on to succeeding generations as readymade, they are increasingly seen as ‘natural’ and thus ‘good’, and are thus perpetuated even though conditions or needs have changed.⁴⁴

This inertia afflicts music education all the more to the degree that music teacher preparation in colleges and universities is dominated by the aesthetic assumptions and ideology of the Classical music world and its traditional agenda. That model of elite professionalism, however, is both different than and clearly at odds with music teaching in the praxial world called “schooling.” That institution, with its agenda of *universal schooling* and *general education*, points instead toward the need for what Haack calls a “socio/functional music education.”

It involves students gaining insight to the sometime subtle influences of music on attitudes, values and behaviors; gaining knowledge of an experience with the functions of music in their culture, subculture, and personal lives; and it involves developing skills that enable them to use it wisely via the ability to discriminate and choose among a broad range of types and styles. And this wise use is . . . also in its functions as an enhancer of verbal communications, as a validator of social institutions and rituals, as an environment modifier, a social unifier, stress buffer, emotion and mood modifier, in its stimulative and sedative effects, and so on. . . . [C]hildren simply must be provided with the tools to choose and use

music wisely, to program their own world of sound and to meet their own human needs, rather than constantly be subject to the whims and wishes of the media. (Haack 1997, 90)

In addition to norms, consideration of *rules* in practice theory reveals important conditions that create and guide praxis. To begin with, in John Searle analysis (1998, 112-134; 1995),⁴⁵ the creation of social practices such as “money” or “music” depends on two kinds of rules: “constitutive” and “regulative” (1998, 123-24). *Constitutive* rules, Searle points out, “constitute, or make possible, the form of activity they regulate” (123)—for example, the conditions defining the praxis called “money.” *Regulative* rules, in turn, “regulate antecedently existing forms of behavior” (123)—for example the exchange rates of “money” or the forms it can take. Depending on the praxis, regulative rules can be explicit or quite tacit.

Such *social realities* are created, first of all, when society assigns what Searle calls particular “status functions” (1998; 126) to physical objects, artifacts, and even nature.⁴⁶ These all have a “brute” or physical reality (122), on one hand, that is “observer-independent” (116); this generally corresponds to the “affordances” of music mentioned earlier. On the other hand, there exists as well an “institutional reality” (122) that is “observer-dependent” (116) or socially created. Concerning such social realities, Searle writes, “in institutional reality language is not used merely to describe the facts but, in an odd way, is partly constitutive of the facts” (115). This echoes Foucault’s analysis of how the practice of language itself is central in constituting other practices (Foucault 1972; see Collins & Makowsky 1993, 253). In consequence, as Peter Martin puts it, “descriptions of music play an important role in fixing its meaning” (Martin 1995, 66; see also 183, 202) and thus its use.

Secondly, the *status functions* assigned by society are not intrinsic or natural, but “exist relative to observers or agents who assign the function” (1998; 121). Giving such a “status function” to ‘things’ *makes them special*⁴⁷ according to the ‘common sense’ intentions, purposes, goals, objectives, values, and ‘goods’ of the society, community, or group. Such common sense “tendencies, habits, dispositions and taken for granted presuppositions” (108) Searle calls the “Background” (107-110) governing social reality—an idea that corresponds in key ways with Bourdieu’s habitus, that other sociologists and Habermas call “life-world,” and that pragmatist philosophers regard as the ‘social mind’.

Practices are thus first constituted or generated by assigning a special status, then regulated or governed by other kinds of rules; for example the rules of games or the rules for decoding musical notation or the musicianship conventions of a particular genre, and so on. However, even in these cases, the rules themselves typically come into ‘play’ and interpretations of the rules vary or evolve, or new rules are stipulated to adjust or improve the praxis in terms of its benefits and purposes and changing conditions (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 18). Just as many games have judges to interpret the rules, decoding musical scores also requires judgment—as do other aspects of performance, such as taking into consideration the acoustical conditions and the *raison d’être* of a musical event, etc. Thus, the outcome of a performance—“the music”—is always at first *indeterminate* and governed by a host of important variables outside the score (in the case of notated music) and even outside the sounds themselves! Even concerning rules, then, praxis is creative and dynamic, and its meanings, processes, and results are *temporally* conditioned, not fixed (on the temporality of all praxis, see Bourdieu 1990, 81-82).

Music as Praxis

The very question of what “music” *is*, then, is socially constituted and regulated to begin with. The determination of the “music world” by habitus is the first step in the “social construction of musical meaning” that is the central finding of current sociology of music (Martin 1995, 25-74). “Music” is an observer relative—which is to say, a social or praxial—function added to the otherwise brute, physical reality of sounds. Sounds produced or used for certain purposes become “music” not by some psycho-acoustical function of the brain, or in terms of some putative abstract, philosophical essence. “Music,” instead, is a *status* assigned to sound according to the *functions* that it makes special, achieves, or is ‘good for’.

The assignment of the functional status of “music” is legitimated and warranted by both individual and collective (shared) intentionality⁴⁸—i.e., Background (habitus or life-world) and individual praxis. However, that status may be contested within the music world to the degree it is anomalous to ‘common sense’ or ‘common practice’; e.g., John Cage’s *4’33”* (of silence), or “free” jazz. Musical value and meaning, then, are not given or fixed qualities ‘in’ the purely physical features of constellations of sound (or the encoding of them in a score); they are a function assigned to such configurations by people according to certain

potentials or affordances such sounds are understood to be ‘good for’ by habitus, the music world at stake, and the type of praxis at stake and its immediate criteria.

At large in any society, and all the more so in complex ones, is a wide range of social practices in which music is a central and even defining ingredient—for example, worship and ceremonies (for more, see DeNora 2000, 46-47). These practices demonstrate that the sounds we are tempted to focus on *alone* as the result of the aestheticization of music and thus that we *call* “the music,” are not the *only* ingredients and sometimes not even the *most important* ingredients at stake. Just as ethnomethodologists have shown that not simply the uttered sounds of speech but bodily ‘expression’ (e.g., face, gestures, etc.) and the situation importantly contribute to the communicated meaning, so ethnomusicologists long ago confirmed that the sonic event alone does not fully or autonomously determine the meanings or serve the functions involved. Such meanings and roles always include other ingredients.

The range of goods and goals, functions, and purposes served by music, then, is as complex as the society, the habitus, and its various fields of musical praxis. Each field has a homogeneity that, at least at its center of ‘common practice’, typically distinguishes it. But the differences *within* a field, especially those involving its dynamic periphery, are often as great as *between* fields. Given the contribution of technology to communication and social interpenetration, “cross-over” musics and other blends and influences are thus the increasing result in contemporary society; for example, Finnish tango and Finnish rap.

Sociological analysis of music thus points away from the conventional aesthetic and traditional musicological view of autonomous works, the disinterested contemplation of autonomous, individualistic and disembodied minds, and the for-its-own-sake status that relegates ‘good music’ properly ‘appreciated’ to rare occasions in the concert hall as a kind of museum (Goehr 1992; McMullen 1968). The repercussions of understanding (and teaching) music and its value in praxial rather than orthodox aesthetic ‘terms’ are complex and consequential. Here it is possible only to summarize some of the most important implications for music and, by extension, for music education.

Ramifications of Considering Music as Praxis

First, the *situatedness (praxial context) of musicking itself is part of its meaning or relevance*; at root, musical meaning and value are always socially imbued, never immanent, autonomous, or distanced from social and personal functions. The “pure gaze” is purely

ideological in its historical origins and thus highly relative to the social (and often class-based) vested interests it continues to serve.

Next, as a generative idea, “music” embraces a *multiplicity of musics*, each of which arises in recognition of different goods and goals. Each is unique in both its socially constituted conditions and regulative practices, and each deserves to be appropriated and valued on its own terms.

Similarly, the musical habitus of any individual will also be situated and thus more limited than the habitus at large—though no less generative for the individual! Differences of habitus *between* individuals are decisive and account for the ‘deaf ear’ just about everyone has for at least some of the musics in their own society (Bourdieu 1993, 305).

Music, then, “is not a ‘stimulus’” (DeNora 2000, 41). The semiotic force and agency of music are not dictated by the acoustical properties of the musical ‘work’ (whether notated or improvised). Instead, the power of music comes “from the ways in which an individual appropriates that music, the things she brings to it, the context in which it is set” (42). Thus, in his important theory of the “social self,” George Herbert Mead makes a key distinction between a “stimulus” and an “object” of appropriation:

The former does not have an intrinsic character that acts upon individuals. In contrast, the meaning of the object is conferred upon it by the individual. Human beings *react* to a stimulus . . . , but they *act toward* an object Individuals are not surrounded by a world of preexisting objects that coerce them; rather, they build up their environment of objects according to their ongoing activities. From a myriad of prosaic everyday acts [including everyday acts of musicking], . . . the individual is making self-notations of objects, assigning them meaning, assessing their utility in reaching various goals, and then deciding what to do on the basis of such judgments. (Collins & Makowsky 1993, 179; italics in original)

Thus, the properties of a musical event (i.e., ‘object’ of attention) that a listener appropriates, and why, differs between listeners—and for the same listener in different situations and over time—and is central in the determination of a particular listener’s meaning.

A key variable between listeners that aesthetic theory considers ‘extrinsic’ is precisely this kind of personal history behind acts of musicking, such as listening, and the personal meaning-making that is its result. The music of Sibelius, for example, clearly has an emotional resonance for Finns that is an accident of birth. Denying the importance of such social and personal conditions (for other examples, see DeNora 2000, 41-45), or disallowing them altogether as ‘extrinsic’ and thus non- or unaesthetic, is a key reason for the falseness or inadequacy of aesthetic theory for most people’s experience of music.

Most listening, in any case, takes place under conditions where some social or personal function is at stake. Religious music is a primary example,⁴⁹ while other examples range from dance, to ironing clothes while listening (attentively) to recordings, to so-called “occasional music” created or selected for making particular social occasions special.⁵⁰ Despite the importance of such musicking in society, the requirement for aesthetic ‘purity’ is violated and thus, depending on the philosopher, aesthetic quality is supposedly corrupted, destroyed, or is said to be missing to begin with. Such narrow construals of music lead Small to observe that “theorists and philosophers, and sociologists too, who take the western symphonic style as a paradigm for human musical activity as a whole are likely to find themselves aground in the shallows of a very small and tidal lagoon while the great ocean of musicking rolls around them unnoticed” (1997, 8).

Viewed socially, then, the Classical music focused on by aesthetic traditions “is not,” as one critic has noted, “a *quality* of, but a *kind* of art” (Dixon 1995, 6 [italics added]; see also 44). Therefore, musics exist not on a hierarchy according to levels of putative aesthetic properties and qualities, but on a continuum best represented horizontally. Each field of music on such a continuum is its own praxis and has affordances, qualities, and benefits that are its *distinctive* goods and purposes.⁵¹ Discrepancies concerning matters of quality may often be disputed within a field;⁵² but comparisons between musical fields amount to what philosophers call a category-mistake of comparing apples and oranges (see, e.g., Carroll 1998, 128).

This leveling of the aesthetic hierarchy to a linear continuum does not necessitate concluding that “anything goes” or anything is as just as valuable as anything else. Quite the opposite; musical value comes from and is particularized in terms of what Bourdieu describes as the socially situated “conditions of possibility” (1998, 130; 1993, 256; 1990, 54 and 135-41). The bottom line is simply not to expect from jazz the affordances of symphonies. Thus, the differences between Sondheim and Schubert represent distinct values, and both can be enjoyed for the unique possibilities they afford.

Classics are also made no less ‘classic’ by leveling the musical ‘field of play’. The classics—of any genre—continue to be resources of musical meaning and value precisely because of the wealth of meanings, uses, and functions they afford. Understood praxially, then, the classics are constantly *transforming* according to changing circumstances and situatedness of praxis, not *fixed* in value or *static* in meaning; e.g., Bach fugues played on

piano, marimba, by saxophone quartets, or heard in scat-singing arrangements all afford different possibilities and thus reward different interests.

For conventional aesthetic theory, following the precedent of the rationalist partiality of Aristotle's *theoria*, music exists to be *contemplated* for its own sake, and its value is thus cerebral and 'serious', 'deep', or 'intense'. Thus, it supposedly exists not to be *used* in daily life but to be *understood*, most typically in out of the ordinary moments of leisure. This intellectualism and connoisseurship is revealed in the famous (or infamous) comment by Schoenberg that, "If it is art it is not for all, and if it is for all, it is not art" (quoted in Martin 1987, 122). Thus, viewed aesthetically, the very *inaccessibility* of music—its esoteric status—is seen as a determining criterion of its alleged high quality (Carroll 1998, 46-47, 97-98) *and*, therefore, the rationale for its study.⁵³ Correspondingly, accessible—i.e., 'popular' or exoteric musics, including even 'light classics'—are seen as merely commercial, aesthetically debased, or even—by Adorno, for instance—as a form of "false consciousness" through which the supposed 'masses' are manipulated.

The assumption of refined (or 'classy') taste in contrast to unrefined (or 'vulgar') taste has been and continues to be a primary motivation of the missionary zeal, "salvation themes" (Popkewitz 2001) and "redemptive" (Carroll 1998, 97) ideas at the heart of 'converting' the masses to the kind of so-called "music appreciation" that is the social basis—or the class *bias*—of mainstream aesthetic theory. Concerning this partiality,⁵⁴ Bourdieu analyses the taken-for-granted, class-based criteria of the philosophical aesthete who,

by taking as the subject of reflection his or her own experience—the experience of a cultured person from a certain social milieu—but without focusing on the historicity of that reflection and the historicity of the object to which it is applied (and by considering it a pure experience of the work of art), unwittingly establishes this singular experience as a transhistorical norm for every aesthetic perception. Now this experience, with all the aspects of singularity that it appears to possess . . . , is itself an institution which is the product of historical invention and whose *raison d'être* can be reassessed through an analysis which is itself properly historical. Such an analysis is the only one capable of accounting simultaneously for the nature of the experience and for the appearance of universality which it procures for those who live it, naively, beginning with the philosophers who subject it to their reflections unaware of its *social conditions of possibility*. (Bourdieu 1993, 255-56; italics in original)

Against the accusations of 'relativism' leveled by aesthetic theorists and traditional musicologists critical of the situatedness recognized by sociologists of music⁵⁵ as central to musical responding and meaning, then, the typical music-appreciation-as-connoisseurship paradigm of 'good' and 'classy' aesthetic purity is itself *culturally relative* (Bourdieu 1984)!

Its supposedly transhistorical, un-situated, ‘pure’ criteria are “themselves marked by the social position of the users” (1993, 262)—namely to the already enculturated constituents of ‘high’ and ‘refined’ Culture—which is then generalized as ‘good’ or ‘natural’ for all others as well, despite differences of social position, needs, and the like. Thus, as McCarthy has found:

The music appreciation movement, with its emphasis on the development of good musical taste for all people, is well documented in music education historical literature. . . . The goal was to develop musical taste along the lines of Western art music, in other words, to propagate and socialize the musical tastes of the socially elite class among all classes. This attitude was prevalent among many music educators who held on tenaciously to the tenets of Western aesthetics. (McCarthy 1997, 74).

This paradigm continues to be a major but unstated assumption of music education (McCarthy 1997, 79) and its ideological bedfellows (Koza 2002).

Aesthetics-based connoisseurship claims can lead to the oft heard “I like music, but don’t know anything about it” inferiority complex on the part of the public (Martin 1995, 69). Such notions may also account for parents who encourage music lessons—private or in school—for their children on the basis of *social* aspirations. For example, music historian Charles Rosen, though writing about the latter 19th and early 20th century, describes the present situation as well: “In the middle class, knowing how to play the piano was thought to give one a social advantage . . . although of course one pretended that it was a purely disinterested love of music that supported the thousands of piano teachers who did their bit for European civilization” (Rosen 2001, 64). In any event, such a cultural inferiority complex has not prevented most people from regularly enjoying and using music (even Classical music), most often, however, in ways that violate the pure, aesthetic premises of music-appreciation-as-connoisseurship—including all those former piano students who no longer play at all nor attend Classical music concerts or piano recitals.

While music is never autonomous of habitus and field, this does not mean that music is not free to ‘travel’ to other situated conditions—such as from worship to concert hall, concert hall to film, or the reverse in either case—or that musicians are incapable of getting outside of their own musical fields and local music world (see Määttänen and Westerlund, 2001). To the contrary, in ‘traveling’, a musical praxis becomes something new, something unique, to be understood as being of its own kind.

The dynamism of music and the limitless appropriations afforded by a given praxis offer compelling evidence to all but adamant or affected aesthetes that music is *misrepresented* by philosophical accounts that assume immanent, autonomous, pure, and timeless meaning. Considered sociologically and praxially, musical meaning varies according to use; thus it follows that *actual uses* of music—by all kinds of people—reveal a range of valuing that is as diverse as are people, their life-worlds, and their needs.

Musicking in modern societies is thus robust and diverse and contributes in key ways to social institutions and practices that *are* society in its present form. At the same time, the creative or evolving nature of existing social and musical practices continually re-constitute and transform music and thus its meaning and value. This dialectic exists as a dynamic but creative tension where music and society, music and the individual, are mutually constitutive and always interactive.

It is abundantly clear, on the other hand, that the speculations and hypotheses of orthodox aesthetic philosophy and the ensuing claims made for music-appreciation-as-connoisseurship have resulted in a certain alienation of Classical music from ordinary people and from everyday life. A praxial account of music, in contrast, stresses the everyday possibilities of *all* musics for *all* lives. Music in and for everyday life, however, does not become so mundane, humdrum, and banal as to escape notice or to deaden life. To the contrary, it is music put into constant (if not literally daily) service as a creative source of personal and social agency and meaning. As DeNora points out, “music is not about life but is rather implicated in the formulation of life; it is something that gets into action, something that is a formative, albeit often unrecognized resource of social agency” (DeNora 2000, 152-53). Thus, for Martin, attending to “the ways in which it is created, performed and heard by specific people in specific social contexts” (Martin 1995, 166)—in other words, attending to music as praxis—is the key to observing music’s sociality in action and to recognizing its many and important values.

Attending to music as praxis, in sum, necessitates considering:

1. The *music world at large* in a society that is the source of the particular musical life-world of any *individual* within it;
2. The various *fields* of music and their ‘positioning’ for social advantage in a music world;

3. The diverse pragmatic *social functions* that music is ‘good for’ and that are its *sources* to begin with;
4. The *basic actions of musicking*—listening, performing, composition—as distinct practices in their own right.

The meaning and value of any musicking, then, exist at (or as) the intersection of these mutually conditioning and always interpenetrating sociomusical dimensions.

Conclusion: Music Education As and For Praxis

Any praxis exists because of the *difference* it makes for individuals and society. The existence of a practice thus points to certain values added to the lives of those who engage in it. This truism raises the issue of whether music education is itself a professional praxis that makes a tangible and significant difference, or merely a collection of stagnant and un-integrated behaviors, customs, and routines that add little or no lasting value to the lives of most students or to society. Since musical meaning arises from use, and since use signifies musical value and meaning, the inability or unwillingness of typical students to *use* in their everyday musical lives what they are taught in schools indicates that much of it is either meaningless to them or lifeless and impotent as to its action value.

Readily available social evidence and everyday observation suggest that “school music” has become a short-term and narrow praxis of its own—one that reaches only a clear minority of students and then in ways that do not “transfer” to musical life after the school years or contribute widely to the musical life of society.⁵⁶ In fact, the extensively recognized and expressed perception, by music educators themselves, of a perpetual *crisis* facing both the field of Classical music⁵⁷ and the field of music education—e.g., the “we don’t get no respect” problems of budgets, scheduling, and other signs of marginalization, etc.—is the result of a lack of commonplace empirical evidence that music education has changed people’s musical lives in the ways claimed by the connoisseurship rationale and paradigm! According to Habermas, such *legitimation crises* (Habermas 1975) arise when inherent contradictions and weaknesses in a social system or institution (such as music education) produce results contrary to or less than the benefits claimed.⁵⁸ Thus, the value and existence of the system itself must constantly be defended and legitimated—a process that apologists of the current institutional paradigm in music education call “advocacy.”

Attempts at *aesthetic conversion* or *redemption* have clearly fallen on ‘deaf ears’ of most students (Green 1988)—even when rock, jazz, and the like are studied under the same music-appreciation-as-connoisseurship conditions as Classical music; that is to say, with an emphasis on theory, “classic works,” historical development, and the like. The connoisseurship model of music appreciation equally falsifies such music by studying it apart from its social conditions and uses, as though it is for odd moments of leisure-contemplation for its own sake. Of course, such study adds no value to the student’s already well-practiced ways of appropriating rock, reggae, or rap. Most often, then, it is rejected on the intuition of its ideological intent—as the imposition of an ‘alien’ and alienating appropriation of ‘our music’ by the Establishment. In fact, modern youth use music in countless ways, but none more important than as a source of identity and *différance* from the adult and school worlds (Ståhlhammer 2000). When such music is appropriated in everyday life outside of school and long after graduation, it is as praxis and not according to the music appreciation paradigm.

“Appreciation,” understood praxially, is a matter of mindful habits of use. So it is the practice of studying “about” music as a High Culture of autonomous, supposedly self-sufficient ‘works’ of pure contemplation and its derived social implications—in other words, the failure of the music-appreciation-as-connoisseurship and ethical-redemption models based on orthodox aesthetic assumptions—that is the source of the mounting legitimization crises facing music education as an increasingly powerless field within the larger world of schooling.

To ‘make a difference’ for students and society and to thus gain a more advantageous social position within the worlds of school and music, music education in all forms will benefit from *returning to a curriculum of music as ‘doing’*—to a curriculum of musicking of various kinds that is mindful of music’s social conditions, criteria, and consequences. The paradigm shift needed to effect the change from *appreciation-as-connoisseurship* to *praxis* requires changes to existing instructional practices and arrangements, and the need for new teaching practices.

First of all, a praxial approach rooted in the social premises presented here would not disown or disavow Classical music. Rather, the Classics would be approached praxially, which is to say from the perspective of active forms of personal musicking and their

transformative effects for individuals and society. Prime among my recommendations for such a praxial focus are:

- Treating *ensembles as musicianship laboratories* that develop adaptable knowledge and skills that students are able to and choose to employ outside of school and throughout life—including, as listeners, arrangers, composers, etc.
- Emphasizing *chamber music* throughout the curriculum—i.e., featuring solos, duets, and small ensembles that promote the habit and pleasures of personal performance and which model performance options that can fit into the busy schedules of contemporary adults.
- Promoting dedicated “*amateuring*” (Booth 1999) predicated on beginning levels of expertise that can serve as a basis for developing further skills; in other words, devotees who take full advantage of the re-creational possibilities of music in the life well lived.
- Developing *musical independence* while students are still in school; i.e., the ability to locate information, to diagnose, and to meet musical needs and solve musical problems on their own.

In addition, a praxially transformed curriculum needs to feature more models of and opportunities for musicking of all kinds, involving a range of musics chosen for inclusion based on the local music world, and keeping in mind the action ideal that universal schooling should benefit *all* students. The above four recommendations also apply to such an expanded range of musical possibilities, but new teaching practices are required—for example along these lines:

- Use of *technology for personal musicking*; everything from MIDI composition software and instruments to computer-based accompaniments of solo literature.
- *Social and folk instruments*⁵⁹ taught at least as a basis for music reading and other general musicianship skills.
- Social and folk instruments as a beginning foundation for *lifelong recreational performance*, and for listening. Thus, creation of groups and other performing opportunities in- and outside of school for such instruments are needed.

- Focusing on options and criteria concerning *everyday musics*, such as music used as religion, in ceremony, celebration, “making special” of particular occasions (e.g., weddings, parties), film and TV music, for aerobics, therapy, etc. (see DeNora 2000).
- *School “clubs”*⁶⁰—rather than teacher dominated ensembles or classes—devoted to promoting or extending *students’* musical interests; these could focus on performance, listening, study, or all three, and might also serve interested adults.
- *Music journalism and criticism* clubs or classes focusing on recorded music, audiophile interests, etc.
- *Partnerships between school and community*; not just occasional ‘run outs’ but a ‘community music network’ that, for example: regularly brings community musicians (i.e., skilled amateurs) into the school; enhances the musical life of the community via student involvement; helps amateurs find one another (and accompanists); offers lessons to and by community members (cross-peer and cross-generational tutoring); programs frequent recitals in and outside of school on the model of the old amateur hours (but without competition); etc.
- Exploration and utilization of the ‘*hidden’ music world* in the community, including regional, ethnic, and other unique local musics.

All of the above should seek to maximize self-inclusion and minimize self-exclusion and competition.

Such transformations of curriculum must especially characterize the general music class curriculum and instruction, which should be focused then on teaching concepts *pragmatically*, as practical and useful *general musicianship skills and knowledge* instead of as abstractions supposedly serving the listening model of aesthetic contemplation. In addition to introducing specialized musicianship studies, ensemble curriculums, too, should be devoted to promoting general musicianship so that students are broadly empowered musically, not limited in their options by having been in this or that ensemble.

The ‘standardized’ student aimed at by the present U.S. national standards (Popkewitz and Gustafson 2002) could be replaced then by the pragmatic and holistic ‘norm’ of educating students who engage in musicking in a way and to a degree of expertise they find satisfying and enriching, and that promotes lifelong involvement and learning and a richer and livelier musical society. With such *value added* results, music education will itself be regarded as a vital praxis; one that, as with other helping professions, is legitimated not by

slogans and advocacy but by the considerable and noticeable benefits it typically produces for individuals and society.

It will thus be characterized by a professional ethic—*phronesis*—that is ‘care-full’ to increase the choices and competencies of all students for musicking. The value of music education will be warranted to the degree that *musical* value is added to the lives of students; in other words, accountability will be concerned with the musicking students are *able to do*, newly or better, and—most importantly—what of such musicking typical students actually *choose to do* in large part as a result of musical instruction. Again, value or “appreciation” will be seen in use!

Rather than following a rationale based on a controversial speculative and metaphysical doctrine of musical value, a doctrine with class-based repercussions that ironically *excludes* more people in its claims for musical redemption than it includes, a sociologically informed and transformed music education will be *inclusive*; it will serve people and society through the self-evident praxial value musicking has in and for life. Just as the affordances of music are appropriated variously according to differences between people and situations, so will the affordances of music education be appropriated differently according to unique variables between learners, teachers, and all the many locally situated factors typically involved. The meaning and value of musical schooling, then, will be *socially observable* and *undisputed* as a result of the distinctive and significant difference music and music education make for individuals and society.

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Notes

¹ For critical accounts of the historical process whereby art and music praxis has been “aestheticized,” see Osborne 2000a, 80-82; Bourdieu 1984, 13-96; Bourdieu 1993, 254-266; for general discussions of the problems associated with this creation of “high” and “fine” Arts, see Bauman 1999, Eagleton 1990.

² A “problematic”: In sociology, this term has come to refer to “the particular unity of a theoretical formation’ [quoting Althusser], the interdependence of its component concepts, and the way in which this facilitates the posing of certain problems and issues while *excluding* others from consideration” (Marshall 1994, 418; italics added). The concept is “broadly equivalent . . . to the concept of PARADIGM in the work of Thomas Kuhn or the concept of EPISTEME in the work of Foucault” (Jary & Jary 1991, 387). Thus the very framing of the problematic of music and musical value in *aesthetic* terms by its very nature excludes or precludes framing it in other terms, such as social. On Foucault’s analysis (Foucault 1972) of “discourse as a system of constraints” that reflect “power” interests, see Collins & Makowsky 1993, 253-258.

³ As Pierre Bourdieu writes, “there are questions that we do not ask of aesthetics because the social conditions of possibility of our aesthetic questioning are already aesthetic, because we forget to question all the nonthetic [i.e., not arbitrary; already prejudiced] aesthetic presuppositions of all aesthetic theses” (Bourdieu 1998, 130).

⁴ By “social theory” is meant the various disciplines of the social and cultural sciences, and social philosophy, such as pragmatism; see, e.g., Elliott & Ray 2003; Joas 1993.

⁵ Although a distinction is sometimes made between “praxis” and “practice,” the differences are subtle, or depend entirely on a particular theoretical context. For present purposes the terms will be used interchangeably, with the plural “practices” being preferred to “praxes.”

⁶ Bourdieu scholars often cite Jenkins’ short critical summary as the best single introduction to Bourdieu’s sociology; see also Wacquant’s introduction to Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992 and Johnson’s introduction to Bourdieu 1993.

⁷ Fields get their habits and dispositions in part from the sociocultural milieu in which they exist that Bourdieu calls *habitus*—the widespread and usually taken for granted sociocultural attitudes or patterns of thought, taste, value, behavior, and principles that are set by historical and socially situated circumstances and that generate or at least condition certain social structures, practices, and fields (rather than others generated by other *habitus*). In a manner of speaking, a field functions in effect as the habitus of its own sub-fields and their various and competing social positions within it. See, Bourdieu 1990, 52-65. *Habitus* is discussed in more detail below.

⁸ Bourdieu’s choice of the expression “field”—*champ* in French—was influenced by his keen interest in sports and the defining role of a ‘field of play’, the taking of ‘positions’, ‘strategic action’, the ‘practical logic’ of spontaneous adaptation to the flow of action structured by the ‘rules’ of the game, and of the praxial learning that comes from simply playing the game—a learning that simply cannot be abstracted into propositions, analytic knowledge, or ‘rational choice’ theories without misrepresenting the dynamics and holism of praxis. See Bourdieu 1990, 102-03.

⁹ The rationalist bias of philosophy has traditionally eschewed empirical bases for its reasoning, especially the *analytic* philosophical tradition (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 337-345; 440-468) adopted by orthodox aesthetic philosophy (N.B., herein, pragmatism and phenomenology are not included in references to traditional or orthodox “aesthetic

philosophy”). Thus, empirical evidence is not the *source* of analytic aesthetic theories of music (as it is in the case of sociology of music, ethnomusicology, and other social theories) but is only sometimes (and, at that, quite rarely) employed *after* the fact of theorizing in an attempt to warrant conclusions reached by rational argument alone.

¹⁰ In philosophy, the fallacy of *obscurum per obscurius* amounts to explaining something that is already vague by variables that are completely unobservable, unverifiable and thus themselves vague, therefore further confusing what was to be clarified. For survey analyses of such “problems of aesthetics” see Janaway 1995; Hospers 1972.

¹¹ The best short analysis of the term praxis can be found in Bernstein (1971, ix-xiii), which is also an outstanding source of the role of the idea of praxis in Hegel, Marx, existentialism, pragmatism, and even analytic philosophy. An excellent analysis of praxis (which also includes the use of the idea by Paolo Freire and Jürgen Habermas) and an equally incisive application of it to education and curriculum are found in Grundy 1987. For an application of Habermas’ theory of praxis to education and educational research, see Carr & Kemmis 1986.

¹² For a fuller account of the Aristotelian bases of praxis as applied to music and music education, see Regelski 1998.

¹³ Such technique can often take the prescriptive, rule-governed form of “methodologism” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 26) or *technicism*—where, that is, methods (e.g., in research, teaching) and techniques (e.g., in musical performance) are valued for their own sake and, thus, without reflection on whether or not practical results or needs are well served (see Regelski 2002 on “methodolatry” in music education). The reduction by the Sophists of politics to such technical, one-size-fits-all formulae, despite the fact that politics (*poli*) involves people and their differences, therefore occasioned the idea of praxis and the praxial knowledge needed to guide practical matters involving people.

¹⁴ ‘Strategic knowledge’ of a game is distinct from an athlete’s physical skills and prowess (see Bourdieu 1990, 80-82; Jenkins 1992, 83-84). However, theories of praxis typically stress that practical knowledge is *embodied* in important ways and therefore tacit and even largely prereflective, at least when ‘in action’. Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus* is based, in part, on Aristotle’s idea of bodily *hexis* or ‘disposition’ to act in a certain way (Jenkins 1992, 750). Such embodied knowing is discussed in more detail below.

¹⁵ Given the historical prejudice for reason over sense, the rise of empirical science in the 16th and 17th centuries was truly a paradigm-breaking and thus threatening source of challenge to arch rationalists and idealists, as Galileo sadly discovered. Nonetheless, while systematic science is rooted in empirical experience (thus experiment), reason has its place in its methods and theory construction.

¹⁶ A similar prejudice has existed since antiquity *against* the body and bodily knowledge, and thus concerning “the mechanical arts” (Summers 1987, 235-265), a prejudice that also explains the inattention of much aesthetic theory to performers and their role, and the secondary status “applied” and “performing” arts typically have in schools and universities; e.g., where “studio” courses are not counted as “general” (i.e., liberal, intellectual, scholarly) education.

¹⁷ Baumgarten was a rationalist, logician and theological hermeneuticist, and his proposed theory is a metaphysical argument that “touches neither on the nature of art *per se* nor on its social import but on the direct sensuous apprehension of actuality” (Davey 1995, 40). However, Baumgarten’s postulating of an autonomous or pure aesthetic knowledge and aesthetic sensibility contributed to the “sister arts” being considered together according to

their supposed aesthetic essence, as well as on other grounds; see Kristeller 1965; Summers 1987.

¹⁸ However, Carroll's analysis of what he calls "the ersatz Kantian theory of art" (Carroll 1998, 107; see 89-109 for the complete argument) demonstrates basic confusions of theories of *art* based on Kant, particularly distortions concerning "free beauty" (i.e., disinterested contemplation of autonomous works for their own sake) and "dependent beauty" (i.e., beauty that is down to earth and good of its kind), which Kant also described but aestheticians have ignored or misrepresented.

¹⁹ It is also instructive to note that the discipline of music theory begins with Rameau's *Traité de l'harmonie à ses principes naturels* in 1722, the heyday of rationalist fervor of the early Enlightenment. The 'scientific' claim to have found such 'principles' in *nature*—as natural laws—is instructive for its blindness to the social, praxial constitution of musical knowledge, skill, and praxis, and for the rationalism involved in its taken for granted realism that such theory is some kind of 'natural law'. Though Rameau's "theory" concerned the 'common practice (praxis)' of his time, it is today often still taught as fact, despite the lack of anything even resembling 'common praxis' in today's pluralism of musics.

²⁰ Concerning Marx's relevance to contemporary philosophy, Bernstein writes that "analytic philosophy has isolated itself from the practical concerns of men From a variety of angles, analytic philosophy has affirmed the importance of social practices and institutions in understanding man—his language, his morals, and especially his activity. But analytic philosophers tend to stop the inquiry just where Marx and the Marxists begin to ask questions. . . . [Marx] showed the possibility and the importance of asking and trying to answer questions which analytic philosophers have scarcely begin to ask—questions concerning the origin and nature of social institutions that pervade and shape human life" (1971, 82-83). The failings of analytic aesthetic philosophy and its falseness to musical experience were noted earlier; for present purposes, Bernstein shows how Marx's theory of praxis suggests a corrective to those failings.

²¹ In appropriating the Aristotelian idea of praxis, Marx included aspects of 'making' that, for Aristotle, were the proper domain of *techne*. But, following Hegel, Marx wanted to stress the important individuation that results from praxis—i.e., by which the individual tangibly realizes (i.e., constitutes) its Self in action—and such 'making' aspects also served his economic and political themes.

²² This theme was an important influence on Sartre's brand of existentialism and has distinct echoes in pragmatism since it, too, has some early roots in Hegel. But these philosophical derivations are outside the scope of the present essay.

²³ Is not *a priori* and absolute in either an otherworldly, metaphysical fashion, as in idealism, or as given by the natural world, as in realism.

²⁴ This discussion of "practical judgment" is based on Bernstein (1971, 213-19); it should not, however, be construed as a *rational choice theory* of praxis that, for example, Bourdieu (1990, 63, 99) has criticized. The "logic of practice" that Bourdieu describes is a functional logic rooted in the 'fuzziness', irregularities, and even incoherence that uniquely situated occasions force on practical decision-making. In the end, then, such practical 'wisdom' amounts to developing a 'feel' and practice-based dispositions that, while not irrational, are not a logician's logic (see Bourdieu 1990, 86-87). Praxial knowledge, then, is constructed from past experience and then brought to bear on presently situated practical needs that are always unique. Such knowledge is not a logical algorithm but a kind of heuristic that evolves according to ever-new praxis. In reference to the rationality of ordinary life, pragmatist

Charles Peirce similarly distinguished *logica utens* (useful or practical reasoning gained through experience) from *logica docens* (formal logic) and pragmatists in general have criticized rational choice theories of judgment; see Kilpinen 2000, 61-63.

²⁵ As we shall see in more detail below, a praxial domain or “field” exists on the basis of similar practical needs or ‘situations’ and the possibilities for action with which they are concerned. In this sense, praxis is not just any practiced ‘doing’, such as eating with chopsticks or throwing a ball; such ‘doings’ are praxial when occasioned by the particular praxis governing, in the first instance, “food,” and in the second, “games” such as baseball. Similarly, simple routines or habits are not themselves practices; they arise and become praxial in terms governed by the praxis of which they are a part; e.g., the routine of using an alarm clock to wake up in time for “work.”

²⁶ I use “music world” in the same sense as the “art world” referred to in various institutional and sociological theories of art: *viz.*, Danto 1981; Dickie 1974; Eagleton 1990; Bourdieu 1993, 254-266; Becker 1982. For an example of a “music world” see Unterberger 1999. Obviously, a “music world” exists within the broader category of “art world.”

²⁷ See Joas 1993, 62, who summarizes: “[Durkheim] sets out to demonstrate that not only the contents of knowledge but even the forms of cognition are socially constituted. The categories of space and time, power and causality, the person and the species, he claims, are all derived from social circumstances and are the model for perceiving and knowing the world as a whole” (1993, 62). That some things are “food” and others are not varies between societies, then. And within the category of cognition called “food”—even within the same culture—exist a multiplicity of foods, especially in complex pluralistic societies where what different sub-cultures call “food” can sometimes seem incommensurable. Thus, too, within the category of the “music” of a particular culture exists many musics, each a field of its own. Even indigenous societies have multiple musical practices according to the different needs served by each—e.g., marriage, death, etc.

²⁸ I do not intend to champion or rely on Bourdieu’s particular theory but rather adopt his term to refer generally to (1) what Bauman calls “culture as praxis” (Bauman 1999), Habermas (and others) “life-world,” Searle (1998) Background (explained in more detail below), and Dewey, Mead and other pragmatists the “social mind”; or (2) to what is loosely understood as “culture” and culture-specific practices, such as music, without, on the other hand, wishing to fall into *culturalism*. For an exposition and critical analysis of culturalism (and its correlate, multiculturalism), see Regelski 2000. The terminology associated with any of the theories mentioned in (1) could serve to elucidate praxis as I approach it here. Bourdieu’s language has been chosen: (a) because of his attempts to overcome the gap between positivist and interpretative positions in the field of sociology (i.e., between ‘subjectivity’ of personal experience and the ‘objectivity’ or facticity of social structures), (b) because of his training in philosophy and thus his familiarity with both the philosophical roots of praxis and its role in contemporary social theory; (c) because his theory is grounded in extensive empirical investigation; (d) because of the “social praxeology” by which he “weaves together a ‘structuralist’ and a ‘constructivist’ approach” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 11) in seeking to avoid being drawn into certain ‘sectarian’ arguments within sociology; (e) because of the “epistemic reflexivity” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 36) which (given the pervasiveness of habitus) seeks to be aware of the unconscious bias promoted by one’s own habitus; and, finally, (f) because of his attempts to go beyond “method” and disciplinary purity to a supra-disciplinary holism that complements the holism and integrity of praxis. His position is not without its critics, of course; see Jenkins (1992).

²⁹ It does not mention the greater St. Louis metro area where J.T. Gates and his students have informally compiled a listing of approximately 450 “nameable” musical practices in that region. However, the local can become increasingly global in this age of technology.

³⁰ Bourdieu uses *habitus* as both plural and singular; he also tends to italicize each use, a practice I shall forego, except in direct quotes from Bourdieu.

³¹ Although its facticity can often be studied ‘objectively’, as Durkheim proposed; however, such objectivation severs the praxis from its supporting conditions and the specifics of its socio-personal instantiation and situatedness in terms of the present goods and goals at stake. Understanding music as Fine Art typically loses sight of its praxial genesis, then, and treats it instead as a taken for granted “given” that is regarded or studied as a ‘thing-in-itself’, i.e., as a pre-constituted and independent ‘reality’. This is not only a problem with Classical music, but for jazz as well (see Taylor 1978) which, as a result, has also become so removed from its origins that it has increasingly become a refined, esoteric ‘taste’ of a few cognoscenti and thus inaccessible to the very social group and life conditions that produced it.

³² The ‘presentness’ and immediacy of praxis also affirms a *temporal* condition by which each instance of musicking is unique. This temporality, its nature and relevance for musical praxis, is not examined in this paper but differs considerably from the variations between putative instantiations (i.e., ‘interpretations’) of abstract or ideal aesthetic meanings said to be involved when performing or hearing a score on different occasions or by different people.

³³ “Contrary to the dominant representation which claims that by relating each manifestation of taste to its social conditions of production sociological analysis reduces and relativizes the practices and representations involved, one could claim that sociological analysis does not in fact reduce and relativize these practices, but rather *removes* them from arbitrariness and absolutizes them by making them both necessary and unique, and thus justified in existing as they exist. One could in fact posit that two people whose habitus are different and who have not been exposed to the same conditions and stimulations (because they construct them differently) *do not hear the same music* and do not see the same paintings and cannot, therefore, arrive at the same judgement of value” [Bourdieu 1993, 305; italics added]. Differences in an individual’s personal musical and social history are also relevant in providing dispositions for why and how the individual habitually ‘acts’ with music—in general and on the moment; see Kilpinen (2000, 86) for Peirce’s pragmatic position on the importance of personal history and habit to meaning making.

³⁴ Musical meaning is regularly taken by musicologists, theorists, and aesthetes to take ‘form’ in (as) the ‘score’ that, with appropriate study, performers and connoisseurs can analyze and thus discern the composer’s expression or expressive intentions, or the Beauty of the “form” itself. That they disagree in their analyses does not deter them from their quest (on why they disagree and the fallacy of the ‘objectivity’ of such analysis, see Guck 1998). The assumption that meaning is ‘in’ the score sometimes even leads to the equally unsupported supposition that non-notated musics—improvisations or ‘works’ passed on by aural culture—are somehow inferior for the lack of precision afforded by careful notation, with Beethoven’s ‘struggle’ to refine and perfect his ideas usually serving as the paradigm case. Correspondingly, performers are largely limited to ‘interpreting’ the composer’s musical ideas or ‘expression’ by studying and respecting the score. Beyond this, most orthodox aesthetic theory is notably silent on the specific role of performance and performers! Of course, this paradigm cannot account for non-notated musics, especially those outside of Western music (see, e.g., Carroll 1998). The very idea that praxis could be notated—or represented or captured adequately in symbols of any kind—is foreign to praxis theory, no

matter how straight-forward the praxis might seem, since the foundations of thought and thus meaning are largely embodied actions, not disembodied consciousness. More on the role of the body follows.

³⁵ That is, given the same perceptual field, personal variables (e.g., training, interest, personal history) “selectively” *predispose perceptual attention*. Thus, for example, a zoologist and a botanist walking in the forest together will, by training, interest and past habit, naturally attend selectively to different “affordances” that are available and, aside from some overlapping perceptions, will often enjoy different details of the shared source of interest. However, one role music education can and should provide is to contribute to the properties that students can *newly* find attentive—in musics with which they are already familiar, and by familiarizing them with musics new to their previous experience.

³⁶ Or do not attend in the same way, or to the same degree.

³⁷ See quotation in n. 33.

³⁸ Thus, the Greek *hexis*—i.e., tacit and thus embodied dispositions (see n. 14)—is *habitus* in Latin, though Bourdieu’s concept carries more social implications than the original ethical implications of the Greek term. For Bourdieu, much ‘learning’ is tacitly embodied by *socializing experience* in childhood, which thus is a different result and typically a more powerful and lasting influence than *explicit teaching*; see Jenkins 1992, 74-76.

³⁹ This disembodiment is reinforced by total disengagement of the body required by contemporary concert etiquette (which is quite different than what existed in the formative days of public concerts)—a problem that is avoided when listening to recordings at home where you can, for instance, conduct along at will. However, a corollary of disembodiment is the “‘disincarnation’ of musical production or reproduction” (Bourdieu 1990, 73) that is (a) accentuated when listening to recordings where visual and social elements of the concert are effaced (i.e., what do listeners look at while listening to opera, symphony, or chamber music via recordings; and what affordances of the “live” and holistic ‘musical’ experience and meaning are thereby missed?); and that is involved (b) to the degree that what is heard via recording is a product of recording techniques and decisions of *tonemeisters* and not what would or could be heard *in situ*—which is already dependent on where one sits and other acoustical variables. And this is as true of multiple-track and thus ideally balanced, ‘tuned’, and blended orchestral recordings as it is of the fact that most ‘pop’ music exists only *as a recording*—videos at least adding visually to the musical experience.

⁴⁰ Since the ancient Greeks, sight and hearing have been privileged over the other senses as “higher” for doing their work at a physical distance, so to speak (Korsmeyer 1999, 12-13 and *passim*). One effect of this has been to eliminate the other senses from aesthetic status due to their supposed disconnection from rational knowledge. Thus even *haute cuisine* and *haute couture* have failed to attain the formal status of Art despite philosophical and sociological argument on behalf of their ‘disinterestedness’ (on food, see philosopher Korsmeyer 1999 and sociologist Gronow 1997; on high fashion see Gronow 1997). Hearing, however, is unlike sight in that you cannot willfully govern the sensory impact by “closing” your ears, nor do you need to be attending in a certain direction to “hear” a sound source, as is the case with looking. Furthermore, the skin, bones, and certain interior spaces and viscera actually ‘feel’ or resonate from sound, as standing in front of a loudspeaker at a rock concert demonstrates. Finally, sounds of nature (including pleasing, calming sounds, but especially adrenalin producing sounds ranging from thunder to growling animals) usually have direct emotional consequences or connotations, at least some of which are much more autonomic and visceral than rational.

⁴¹ Broudy uses “feelings” and “emotions” uncritically and thus interchangeably, although neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers of mind are usually at pains to distinguish them; e.g., Damasio 1999.

⁴² Small (1998) demonstrates this to be the case even for listening in a concert hall.

⁴³ E.g., the author has attended a dance that featured only a drummer, and a formal jazz concert that nonetheless encouraged dancing in the apron in front of the stage.

⁴⁴ Thus, the process in the history of science traced by Kuhn (1970) by which “normal science” is surpassed only with breakthroughs worthy of being called “revolutions” applies no less to schooling in general and also to music education in particular.

⁴⁵ For an application of Searle’s description of the “construction of social reality” (1995) to practice theory, in particular its relation to Bourdieu’s theory of praxis, see Swidler 2001, 82-83; for its relevance to the embodiment of meaning, see Johnson 1987, 178-190.

⁴⁶ Concerning nature, e.g., the untouched piece of nature in Japan that became a religious shrine because of its uncanny resemblance to a Zen garden; but also such mundane ideas as a swimming hole, a fishing stream, a landmark mountain, the “rock” that becomes a “hammer” when driving tent stakes, and a “nice day for a picnic” (Searle 1998, 116), etc. As ‘social realities’, artifacts should be understood as including not just ‘works’ of music (scores) and art (paintings, sculptures, buildings) but improvisations, performance art, etc., that, despite having no fixed or repeatable instantiations, have empirical properties (“affordances”) of the moment that are “appropriated” differently according to the praxis and person.

⁴⁷ On what she calls “making special,” see ethnologist Ellen Dissanayake 1991, 1992.

⁴⁸ For the distinction between and relevance of individual and collective intentionality to the creation of social reality and meaning, see Searle 1998, 85-110 and 118-20, respectively, and Johnson 1987, 182.

⁴⁹ Thus philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff (1980) is led to defend religious music against the orthodox aesthetic assumption that its use in worship (not to mention the existence of a text, with references to determinate concepts of various sorts) violates the “pure gaze” and thus disqualifies it as for-its-own-sake and disinterested.

⁵⁰ Mozart’s *divertimenti* are “occasional music”; that is, music serving particular functional occasions. He would no doubt be surprised that these compositions are listened to today as though for their own sake. They were ambient music used as background to socializing, eating, and drinking, and not much different than similar uses today of (usually recorded) music to create an effective social ambience for events like parties and dinners. Similarly, madrigals were praxial after-dinner socializing sung by those thereby gathered. Featuring madrigals as concert music for-its-own-sake is an example of the aestheticization of music history. The (at the time popular and thus entertaining) themes of food, gluttony, wine, digestive eruptions, and the intrigues and longings of “courtly love” were exceedingly down to earth and amusing—effects that are altogether lost in concert performances today that, given such aestheticization, absurdly adopt a “serious” and “profound” interpretation to meet the “pure gaze” criteria of Beauty.

⁵¹ “Distinctive” in two senses: Qualities, goods, and purposes that distinguish musical practices from one another, and that *socially distinguish* users according to their ‘tastes’ and the contribution such music makes to being ‘classy’—at least in the users’ own eyes. See Bourdieu 1984; for a summary, see Jenkins 1992, 128-151.

⁵² ‘Positioning’ as to deliberations of quality exists within every field of praxis. To be sure, even much Classical music is either judged by various authorities as being of low quality on the basis either of the technical claims, interests, and criteria of conservatory trained

musicians or on the equally authority-ridden aesthetic grounds of aesthetic philosophy and traditions. Thus such Classics are consigned to “pops” concerts of “easy listening” or, to take the more interesting phenomenon of “nationalistic composers,” are often considered “good music” mainly by listeners and musicians in the composer’s homeland. Thus, even within Classical music, a *pecking order* arises that typically puts chamber music and the symphonic literature in general at the very top (i.e., ‘pure’ music, without a text or even programmatic titles), with other Classical music arrayed variously below it. No matter how otherwise esoteric or specialized a ‘taste’, say, the art song literature may be, music with words is lower on the aesthetic ladder (and altogether problematic to aesthetic theorists; see Kivy 1990) by virtue of the determinate meanings contributed by the words. Choral works, on the other hand, have a certain mass appeal—often due to religious meaning—that typically puts them even lower on the aesthetic or artistic ladder. And, of course, the literature for some instruments is itself regarded more highly than for other instruments. The status in the Classical music world of non-orchestral instruments such as organ and guitar is especially problematic; and the accordion is acknowledged as a ‘real’ (i.e., ‘serious’ as opposed to ‘folk’) instrument only in some European conservatories.

⁵³ See Jenkins (1992; 132-34) for a summary of Bourdieu’s account of the class-based assumptions of arts education.

⁵⁴ Elsewhere Bourdieu refers to this as the “antigenetic prejudice”—the unconscious or stubborn refusal to seek the historical genesis and arbitrary, relativistic conditions of one’s internalized values, etc. (Bourdieu 1990, 295); that is, where those who regard themselves as “cultivated,” as Jenkins’ summarizes, “confront their own distinction as taken for granted and natural, a marker of their social value, their status” (Jenkins 1990, 133).

⁵⁵ Pragmatism and various strains of phenomenological philosophy also acknowledge a central role for such situatedness. But, as Karl Mannheim (1936, 1952) demonstrated, ideas and values are always those of, and therefore relative to a particular person, time or place—even the idea that values are absolute, universal, and eternal! Failure or refusal to recognize this historicity (including the shaping influences of their own lives, ideas, and values) and the resulting unavailability of social and historical relativism leads those most favored by particular ideas to assert their validity for everyone else, thus leading to ideology. In the present case, then, aesthetes’ alliance with aesthetics leads to aesthetic ideology in arts education (Schönau 1981).

⁵⁶ On the ‘disconnect’ between the different musical ‘worlds’ of school and personal musical praxis of adolescents, see Ståhlhammer 2000.

⁵⁷ Orchestras, for example, are constantly threatened by shortages of financial resources due to their narrow audience base and high production costs—even with generous state-supported grants in many countries (while, in comparison, other musics favored by non-privileged classes get no public grants; Martin 1995, 10-11). Orchestras in smaller cities continue to fold, opera companies are faced with shortened seasons, and sales of Classical music recordings remain at 2-3% of all sales—that small figure despite the larger sums of disposable income upper class musical cognoscenti have for purchasing, say, multiple recordings of various works, etc.

⁵⁸ “Immanent critique” uses such positive *claims* made by institutional traditions and their apologists as *criteria* for judging the institution’s *actual* effectiveness. To the degree the institution falls short of its claimed benefits—or creates new problems—a legitimation crisis arises that necessitates rationalizing the benefits of the institution despite failing to meet its own stated criteria; or that ‘explains away’ such failings by casting blame elsewhere (e.g., in

the case of music education, blaming the commercial media, too much TV and videogames, competition from sports or computers, poor parenting, etc.); or that re-describes claimed benefits in new, high-sounding but notably vague language—such as are provided by aesthetics-based rationales for musical value and music education. Thus are music educators often guilty of the *obscurum per obscurius* fallacy mentioned earlier.

⁵⁹ As opposed to standard instruments of the orchestra, these involve various kinds of common folk instruments associated with different ethnic or regional musical traditions—everything from guitars to steel drums, dulcimers to pan pipes, etc. Such instruments are typically learned at beginning levels with little formal study, yet are capable of eliciting a wide range of expertise that is typically advanced not by technique study, etc., but by simply playing ever more demanding ‘literature’.

⁶⁰ For example, on the basis of Japanese *kurabu* (also called *bu-katsudo*) that are led by students and where teaching of instruments, etc., is also done by students, although the teacher may be called upon to provide assistance or coaching, especially for conductors.