

Doing and Publishing Music Education Research: Promoting Careers, Disciplines, or Teaching?

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Music education research today continues in well-worn paths. While it may be productive in quantity, it is not clear the degree to which it informs current music teacher education or has produced advances in teaching practice. Indeed, as some critics of university-based teacher education research have argued (e.g., Boyer 1990; Schwandt 2005), such research is more often conducted according to the paradigms, interests, and needs of the Ivory Tower rather than to the down-to-earth conditions and needs of schools and schooling. The present essay raises questions about and offers a perspective on some key aspects of this problem in music education. After a survey of some general concerns regarding scholarship and disciplinarity, the articles in the present issue of ACT are used to expand upon particular themes of importance to both to music teachers and to music education researchers.

i.

Despite reflecting certain trends in scholarship, many of the premises and modes of music education research remain firmly rooted in conceptions of research and disciplinarity that are being critiqued and analyzed in other fields. Some disciplines have become progressively more *reflexive* and analyze and critique their own premises (e.g., DeNora 2003; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992; Bourdieu 1990a). Joseph Kerman's reflections on musicology (Kerman 1985) helped to reconsider its scope and methods and were among the influences leading to the "new musicology" and its decidedly social emphasis. Today musicology is further undergoing a so-called "critical turn" motivated by postmodern thinking (e.g., Kramer 2006). And social theory in general, including educational theory in particular, has seen a "performance turn" that stresses praxis, "knowing practice," and "practice theory" (Schatzki et al., 2001; Schatzki 2002, 58-122; Wenger 1999; Carr 2005; Dunne 2005; Kemmis 2005).

The very nature of disciplinarity is also interrogated by taking particular note of the problems that have been overlooked (or created) by the specialized scholarly professions that were formalized beginning with the Enlightenment. Despite differences, the newly emerging disciplines shared and institutionalized an 18th century view about “what it means to represent the world in words, as an object of knowledge” (Kemmis 2005, 400).

These shared ideas about representation emerged in the ordering of knowledge in a variety of fields, and they emerged as responses to order, not only in the discursive or intellectual sense, but also in the sense of ordering the relationships between the knowers of this knowledge and others The emerging disciplines were, or involved, what Foucault describes as *technologies of power*. These technologies are not just tools to be used or wielded by individuals; they embrace the user as the subject of this knowledge and the people or things that are the objects of the knowledge in a social field which the knowledge itself helps to shape and sustain. (Kemmis 401; italics original).

As a result, disciplines have too often been shaped into narrow, disconnected, and ineffectual ‘silos’; repositories of knowledge manufactured, stored, and circulated according to university and scientific epistemologies, following their “cult of the abstract” (Korsyn 2003, 52).

By putting knowledge into a portable form, into a format that can be summarized and paraphrased, it becomes a commodity. Abstracts circulate like money, like coinage passed from hand to hand. The type of work that is successful, that is encouraged, depends on its susceptibility to this sort of summary. (52; see also 21, 24-25).

This commodity is stored in and circulated by means of journals, texts, and monographs, and is accompanied by a demand for ever-new, improved ‘products’ that build careers as much as (maybe more than) making original contributions to knowledge or solutions for practice (Korsyn 2003, 6; Agger 1998, 23). The *quality* of this commodity is time and again determined—within disciplines, and by university hiring and tenure policies—by various forms of *quantification*, such as how much a scholar publishes, the number of times a published study is cited, the rejection rates of the journal in which research is published, or the reputation of the publisher. With its hierarchy of journals, professional associations, and programs that produce its leading practitioners, a discipline becomes an institution of its own by which scholars construct their professional identities (see, e.g., Korsyn 2003, 62-67). Thus, all manner of power and authority is brought to bear on preserving the sanctity of the institutional agenda of a discipline, on

standardizing and thus regulating its discourse (Korsyn 2003, 20), and of reproducing the institution for future generations—preferably unchanged (except for adding more to the contents of its silo).

What often goes unnoticed, however, are the *exclusions*—the “unthought categories of thought which delimit the thinkable and predetermine the thought”¹ that unconsciously (but nonetheless selectively) sort only this knowledge for storage in that specialized silo. Like the viewfinder of a camera, then, a discipline frames out far more than it includes. On one hand, this scholarly frame can disconnect such research from the typical complexities and disorderliness of real life—for example, teaching or responding to music under everyday conditions. On the other hand, this selective focus helps give such research its scientific, scholarly character—its university-framed epistemology.

While this can be useful in advancing a discipline, problems typically arise when a discipline shares its object of study with other disciplines—in our case, music and music education. Then, unlike a farmer’s functional clustering of real silos, a dysfunctional distancing, even estrangement, can be created between disciplines; for example, the typically contradictory attempts of theorists and musicologists to account for “music” (e.g., Korsyn, 61-137). However, both of these disciplines—often including even the “new musicology”—share a focus that is so assiduously on musical “works” (scores) that the actual role of music in the lives of real people, studied by the sociology of music, is altogether lost. Indeed, it is not just overlooked, but steadfastly rejected as irrelevant, even as heretical, for understanding music and music history from a social rather than a ‘purely musical’ perspective.² Excluded, then, is the human meaning and value, the actual ‘music appreciation’ that is revealed only in the *use* or pragmatic role of music in everyday life and society by real people (Martin 2006; Regelski 2006).

Also lost in narrow conceptions of disciplinarity are the possibilities for fruitful and functional communication between the typically separate and disconnected silos thus created.

When groups stake their identities on a particular mode of discourse, they often cannot recognize the exclusions that frame their own knowledge. Under these circumstances, communication between factions breaks down. Like gears that do not mesh, their discourses cannot engage each other. (Korsyn 2003, 6)

Thus, an on-going competition exists, for example, between musical disciplines for the cultural authority to speak about music. As a result, discourse about music itself becomes central to the “politics of hearing” by which different disciplines seek to influence how (and even why or which) music is heard (Martin 2006).³ Contrary to the claims by many musician scholars of music’s ‘for-itself’ purity—the “automania” of treating music as though it descended from Mars (Ridley 2004)—discourse about music involves “games of power” (Korsyn 2003, 5) and has an important bearing on how music is actually heard. “The assumption that musical experience is the starting point for investigation, and language merely a means of conveying the results, must give way to the realization that experience is already constructed in discourse” (Korsyn 2003, 36).

A discipline’s technical language and other “standardized discourse” (Korsyn 2003, 20) does identify ‘insiders’ to each other (e.g., as “musicologists,” “theorists,” “music educators,” etc.) and provides a certain professional bond. However, a realm of ‘outsiders’ is also set apart in the process.

Members of opposing groups seem to be speaking different languages or playing different language games. When individuals stake their identities on particular language games, they regard each other’s work with indifference or even with contempt. Scholars seem to be addressing ever smaller groups, unable to communicate with each other, much less with a wider audience. As voices become increasingly shrill, the hope of building a community, of joining a common enterprise, lies in ruin. (Korsyn 2003, 16)

As a result, ‘outsider’ discourse is typically seen as a challenge to be vanquished, dismissed, or ignored (e.g., Rosen 2006, 2005).

In the face of such fragmentation of the ‘object’ of study (e.g., something called “music”), calls for *interdisciplinarity* (or “soft boundaries,” Detels 2002; but compare Bowman 2002) or for *postdisciplinarity* (that challenges to begin with the arbitrary imposition of boundaries; Korsyn 2003, 40) typically go unfulfilled or are summarily rejected. The very blinkering that earns professional membership in a discipline discourages challenges to disciplinary boundaries from the first. “Graduate training is complete when the norms of the profession are internalized, when the individual becomes self-monitored” (Korsyn 2003, 28). Thus, after years of gaining admittance to the institution, insiders (e.g., new PhDs) are often

unable or unwilling to venture outside its comfortably predictable walls. Indeed, they are more often rewarded for staying safely within those walls.

Music educators are expected to become competent musicians. However, the formal study of “music” in higher education involves “a relational and ever-changing network of disciplines” (Korsyn 2003, 41): formal study of ‘core’ disciplines of music theory, style and form analysis, aural skills, music history, and copious studies of performance practices of various kinds (e.g., solo, chamber music, and large ensembles), typically of the European classical music canon alone. The relevance of such ‘disciplining’ of musicians is taken for granted by most music professors. However, theory, history, and analysis are characteristically taught more as *introductions to their respective disciplines* than with a focus on the conditions of their *use* by typical music practitioners. The latter would require an entire re-thinking of the content and pedagogy of such courses. In the meanwhile, music students are expected to accomplish this integration on their own, and that they (somehow) achieve such a functional synthesis is simply taken for granted.

Many music educators like to think of music education as a discipline—or as a profession—but thus far the field has lacked basic agreement, let alone ‘discipline’, regarding premises, paradigms, and practices for either teaching or research. However, it has no shortage of the ‘professing’ of disparate perspectives that reflect its own sub-specialties (modeled to a degree on disciplines such as psychology, philosophy, history, etc.) and allegiances to various teaching ‘methods’. These are all stored and, more usually, sequestered in mutually exclusive silos. As with professional journals in other fields, what is accepted for publication, then, is framed by the specialized research paradigms of a journal and tends to follow the leaders in that field rather than challenging or changing them (Korsyn 2003, 23).

Attempts have been made to make such research more relevant and intelligible to practitioners, but the “institutional imperative” (Kharasch 1973) to protect and preserve traditional institutional paradigms has been difficult to resist or overcome. Typically, then, research fills the tall and narrow silos of this or that sub-specialization or special-interest group in music education and, just as typically, it is mainly comprehensible, or relevant, to like-minded readers or researchers. Some journals may sample research from different disciplines, but

individual studies tend to follow models from the narrower silos, or the discipline of peer review is forsaken in favor of relevance or readability for teachers.

ii.

Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education seeks to provide an alternative. First of all, the MayDay Group,⁴ sponsor of ACT, is predicated on improving communication and on fomenting *critical discourse* in music education. ACT, therefore, seeks to promote dialog about issues that are often immune from scrutiny by being stored in silos accessible mainly to sympathetic insiders,⁵ restricted by the gatekeepers of specialized journals and special-interest groups, altogether ignored or rejected by competing discourses or epistemologies, or that fall ‘between the cracks’ created by the distances separating specialized journals. And, as its title reveals, it is decidedly *reflexive* concerning the institution of music education and its traditional premises, paradigms, and practices—the “unthought categories of thought which delimit the thinkable and predetermine the thought” (see n. 1) typically taken for granted by musicians and music educators. Instead of a single-minded affiliation with a particular specialty, it takes a postdisciplinary stance by publishing research from across the spectrum of research modes and topics.

However, it offers more than a mere miscellany of research: its diverse offering is unified and given focus and force by the guiding criteria of the seven action ideals that are the agenda of the MayDay Group,⁶ an agenda that is comprehensive of the major issues of relevance to the practice of music education. Its particular focus, moreover, is “action for change” in music education and, with this very down-to-earth goal in mind, every effort is made to address topics of relevance for improving the effectiveness and thus the status of music education. One beneficial result has been serving as an outlet for research topics, themes, interests, and methodologies that do not neatly fit the institutional agendas of specialized research journals—research that, nonetheless, deserves to be published due to its importance to the practice of music education. Another benefit has been the opportunity afforded to authors who explore the gaps between specialties in search of fruitful connections that are otherwise overlooked or excluded.

The several special book review issues of ACT have brought research from various disciplines to the attention of music educators by innovative means. Rather than the usual book review that gives the perspective of a single reviewer, book review issues feature multiple *essay-reviews* that apply, interpret, interrogate, engage with, and otherwise analyze and reflect on the book under review *in terms of its relevance and interest to music educators*. In so doing, research from some of the tallest silos has been brought to bear on the needs, interests, and critical perspectives of music education: monographs dealing with musical identity, feminism and aesthetic theory, race and music, philosophy of music education, and two different sociological studies have been reviewed, each of which includes a reply by the author of the book under review. One special issue of ACT presented the proceedings of the Third Symposium on Sociology of Music Education (April 2003, University of North Texas), a research focus that, despite its clear importance to music educators, has no journal of its own and is significantly under-represented in other music education journals, given their specialized agendas.

Despite its postdisciplinary stance, ACT has nonetheless insured the quality of the diverse research it publishes by virtue of its *solid refereeing process*.⁷ This stance also leads to minimizing insider discourse and helps ACT to be more *accessible* to teachers and music education students without, on the other hand, either talking down to them or boiling down the content. In practice, then, submissions typically go through several stages of rewriting, clarifying specialized terms, and avoiding technical jargon and the like in favor of more easily comprehended language. In addition to submissions that are turned down by reviewers, then, are those where authors decline the often considerable revision, even major rewriting, that is often required.

ACT is also highly conscious of its *international audience*. As an eJournal its readership extends to the entire world of researchers and teachers, not just to subscriptions—not even just to music educators. As a direct result, authors also expose their work to much broader critical appraisal. For example, one article elicited replies by four scholars from three other countries. Furthermore, the ACT home page is linked directly to a discussion forum where readers can comment and react to articles instantly and as formally or informally, extensively or briefly as

they wish. And even when an article is rooted in certain local specifics (as is the case with several articles in the present issue), authors are encouraged to frame their research in terms that are relevant and interesting to readers in other countries or situations.

As an eJournal, students and scholars can access and search ACT easily from their computers. We are proud of its professional appearance and the ease with which notes can be read without scrolling to the bottom of the page or jumping to and from the end of the article. ACT can also directly integrate other media in ways not possible with print journals. For example, recorded excerpts of interviews and musical examples can be included, and even raw data (etc.) can be incorporated as appendices (since printing costs are not at stake). ACT has published articles in other languages along with a parallel version in English. While it has a minimal “house style” for consistent formatting, scholarly style and documentation protocols are determined by the nature of the research and the preferences of authors, as long as they are consistent and clear to readers.

In general, then, we feel that ACT provides a unique contribution to music education research, theory, and practice. It joins the growing movement of professional research journals that, taking advantage of the Internet, now make research available to readers around the world without sacrificing quality.

iii.

The present issue is representative of the mission of ACT to offer a variety of research topics and modes, in terms accessible to non-specialists, and that are of interest and relevance to “action for change” in music education.

The first article, by Lauri Vakeva, offers a clarification and application of aspects of John Dewey’s philosophy of art and music that have often been misunderstood, even by philosophers (such as Susanne Langer; see Alexander 1987, 183) and, in particular, by philosophers of music education who quote Dewey in support of neo-Kantian aesthetic conceptions that Dewey was in fact at pains to critique (such as Bennett Reimer; see Määttänen 2003). Vakeva clarifies Dewey’s “naturalistic” theory of art and music and distinguishes it from “transcendental” aesthetic conceptions of ‘high culture’. “Understood in naturalized terms,” Vakeva point out, “ ‘culture’

is not a superstructure that transcends everyday experience. It is the experience itself, as lived, refined, and cultivated in community life. In the broadest sense, the concept of ‘culture’ is extended to refer to the art of life through which people attempt to understand the world they live in.” In Dewey’s pragmatic and down-to-earth conception, this “art of life” is regarded as an ever-transforming praxis that, as Vakeva shows, benefits from a fruitful connection between ‘school music’ and music in society. Under such conditions, “the arts, including music, should be considered as integral fruits of human cultivation, but the latter should be conceived as no more insubstantial than cultivation of the land.”

Patrick Jones, too, is concerned to connect ‘school music’ with life and the world of music. His focus, however, is the increasing *globalization* of society—the constant “flow of people, images, ideas, practices, and products” that is creating “a sense of global community and delocalization as well as personal dislocation” at the same time it brings about a “cultural de-territorialization where people’s loyalties are divided between the nation-state in which they reside and their ethnicity or sense of nationality that might not necessarily be reflected within or bound by the borders of their nation-state.” In the world today, he points out, music is both a primary vehicle of globalization and is itself directly influenced by globalization.

However, Jones also shows that music education today is ill-suited to the magnitude and rapidity of this change. Thus, he recommends the kind of comprehensive reexamination of ‘school music’ that would enable music education to make a direct and consequential contribution to the conditions and needs of the new “creative economy.” To this end, he argues that “pedagogy should be focused on developing student musicianship, creativity, and musical expression and, thus, should be modeled after the ‘creative workplace’ ” that is rapidly emerging. To initiate discussion of such ends, he offers specific proposals for restructuring music education and concludes that “the role of music education in the global era is not to serve ‘art’ or ‘music’, or tradition, or our needs, but to serve society.”

Aspects of our increasingly globalized world are also highlighted in David Elliott’s account of how he, a Canadian and professor at an American university, was entrusted with establishing a music education Master’s degree program at the Puerto Rico Conservatory, despite not speaking more than a few words of Spanish. In undertaking this project, Elliott turned to the

relatively new field of *performative pedagogy* and its themes of performatives, performativity, and performance studies—in this case, all as related to Paolo Freire’s *critical theory*. In this innovative field, “performance” is extended far beyond common ideas of, for example, performing “works” or “pieces” of music and, for present purposes, is worth highlighting briefly.

As Elliott explains,

performance studies focus on the agency, rituals, “behaviors,” protocols, gestures, enactments, and social processes of festivals, political rallies, classroom transactions, and sports; the performing arts; everyday communications; social, racial, and gender roles; and the “actions” of paintings, poetry, fiction, and so forth. Indeed, the “performance turn” re-casts nouns as verbs; anything at all can be taken “as” performance. The aim is to understand how participants in performances respond to and make meaning of events *in situ*, over time, and in different contexts.

Performance studies take cognizance of the fact that everyday communication often involves the use of speech acts called *performatives*. Unlike *constatives*, which make statements, give answers, or make predictions, performatives ‘do’ or create the things to which they refer: for example, “Let the meeting begin.” What is thereby created also brings about certain new creative potentials of its own. “I thee wed,” then, originates a “marriage” and with ‘it’ the countless options by which each marriage is uniquely enacted.

Performance studies “study actions – actions of all kinds, in all places” (including speech acts) and the field is decidedly inter- or postdisciplinary. As noted above, one trait of performance studies is to think of certain static and abstract nouns as verbs and gerunds—as actions, enactments, ‘doings’, ‘performances’ (e.g., musicing, amateuring, loving)—in order to stress and study-in-action the ‘doer’ (the ‘actor’) the ‘doing’ (the acting or ‘performing’) and the ‘done’ (the created result).⁸ Thus, despite the seeming stability of a noun (or the ‘thing’ to which it points, such as “music” or “love”), a range of performative potentials is often at stake that allows (indeed, promotes) considerable, even radical differences between the realizations of different ‘actors’ in different particular situations.

Even ‘objects’, whether created or natural, are studied for the range of actions they afford. This has important implications for musicians and music educators. As Nicholas Cook describes, “the contemporary performance studies paradigm stresses the extent to which signification is constructed through the act of performance, and generally through acts of

negotiation between performances, or between them and the audience. In other words, performative meaning is understood as subsisting in process, and hence by definition is irreducible to product” (Cook 2003, 205). In this view, then, “music” is irreducible to a score as the definitive “text.” Accordingly, “current performance theory” concludes that “there is no ontological distinction among the different modes of a work’s existence, its different instantiations, because there is no original” (207; see, also, n. 29 below). In this understanding, then, we do not have “music” *and* its “performance,” just performances! And this perspective includes the diverse appropriation of the *affordances* at stake, as realized by different listeners according to their different interests and purposes (see DeNora 2000, 38-41).⁹

Regarding education, Elliott analyzes “schools,” “teachers,” and “learners” in performative terms: “schooling,” “teaching,” and “learning.”¹⁰ However, given the options or potentials chosen and how they are enacted, not all performance realizes the best possible outcomes. In fact, some fail to consider the fullest and most productive range of options or simply fall short of being effective. Consider, for example, the understanding of “discipline” that equates it with conformity enforced through threats and punishments.¹¹ Accordingly, Elliott uses examples from Puerto Rican society and music education to illustrate the nature and importance of *critical* performative pedagogy. This is a pedagogy that understands “the pedagogical site as a *problematic* space of racial, economic, moral, and social tensions requiring deep injections of social justice and civic courage” and, thus, that regards “the classroom as an opportunity for doing political and social *work* with and for students, teachers, and the communities in which they live.” In the description of his work with in-service teachers, Elliott shows us the importance of this new field for music educators everywhere and echoes both Vakeva’s and Jones’ concern for the down-to-earth, pragmatic relevance of music and music education for society.

Society, too, is a major concern of Stephan Bladh and Marja Heimonen who draw upon Jürgen Habermas’ concept of *deliberative democracy* and apply it to the problems and prospects of music education in Finland and Sweden—problems and prospects that bear key similarities to related issues in many other societies.¹² In Habermas’ view, society is understood in terms of the *lifeworld*—“the group context in which human beings create their identity, norms, and values in

terms of legality and morality”—and as a *system*—“steered, even manipulated, by money, power, authority, bureaucracy, and political parties.” *Communicative rationality*, a key element of deliberative democracy, seeks to promote “consensus and understanding in and of the lifeworld” while “*strategic rationality* aims,” instead, “at the effectiveness of the system, and it is thus success-oriented, not understanding-oriented.”¹³

Their comparative study of Finnish and Swedish music education involves both compulsory (i.e., ‘school music’) and voluntary music education (i.e., community music schools, private lessons, etc.) and analyzes key practices of music education in these countries that will be of interest to music educators elsewhere. In particular, they contrast “fast democracy” (short-term reaction of cooperating individuals to a pressing issue, such as protecting a music education program from being undermined by weak funding or scheduling) to “deliberative democracy” with its on-going communicative rationality and practical discourse in the service of long-term benefits (e.g., the kind of strengths that can eliminate the need for short-term defensive strategies). They argue, then, for communicative rationality as a continuing basis for developing “a more comprehensive and long-lasting basis for music education across society”—a basis that includes ‘school music’ as well as various community-based forms of voluntary music education.¹⁴

Going one step further, they apply the concept of communicative rationality to music *pedagogy* itself, stressing the difference between the ‘strategic’ notion of a teacher as manipulator or authoritarian in comparison to a teacher “who *engages* with pupils and facilitates their learning through dialog.” Thus, they argue for new pedagogies where “music teachers act more like mentors and guides than conductors or dictators.” The envisaged result is to realize the potential for music education to, on its own account, provide an education in deliberative democracy and, thus, to be a strong force for “the promotion of democracy in society.” The ‘medium’ of teaching music through deliberative democracy thus becomes at least a major part of the ‘message’ or intention of increasing communicative rationality and deliberative democracy in society at large.

Finally, Jürgen Vogt raises the issue of social and cultural differences reflected in languages and the difficulty (to put it in Habermasian terms) of communicative rationality and

other discourse across languages, cultures, societies. Differences between languages—and the different “lifeworlds” and “systems” from which they arise and to which they refer—represent a significant challenge to discourse concerning teaching research and practice. Vogt alerts us to this challenge by taking note of the “ ‘nationalisation’ ” of thinking about music education “that makes communication difficult across national boundaries, traditions, and languages,” with the unfortunate result that “many valuable theories, ideas, and experiences fail to be considered.”

Differences of lifeworlds and systems between nations are considerable, despite surface similarities. For example, the mere existence of something called “music education” in schools conceals many key differences linked to cultural variables rooted in national traditions and values (examples of which Bladh and Heimonen describe in their comparative analysis of Finnish and Swedish “music education”). Thus, to begin with, what is discussed, why, how, and to what actual ends, is often considerably different between nations. One result is that the traditional educational theories, philosophies, and practices of a nation—in Vogt’s examples, of Germany—often remain largely unknown outside the country of origin.

Secondly, key terms often resist adequate translation. Vogt mentions, for example, the terms *Didaktik* and *Bildung*¹⁵ as used in German educational discourse and, thus, in German music education. Discourse rooted in such difficult to translate terms, then, is most fully cognized only by native speakers.

In fact, words and terms, that they exist at all and why and how they are used, tell us much about the lifeworld and inhabitants of a society and about the social fields created by scholarly disciplines. As was mentioned earlier, a discipline regulates and standardizes its discourse, (Korsyn 2003, 20). An exploration of some performative dimensions of the discourse of educational research can, then, serve to illuminate some issues concerning music education research and practice.

iv.

To begin with, words create certain social realities that differ between societies or over time.¹⁶ For example, as understood today, the very idea of “art” (*viz.*, “fine arts,” “*beaux-arts*,” etc.) dates from the late 17th and early 18th centuries. History texts that date “art” back to antiquity (or

that treat cave paintings as “art”) are applying modern conceptions to praxis that was, in its time, different in almost all regards from the present understanding. The same can be said for so-called “primitive art” exhibited and sold in galleries today (Price 1991).

Likewise, before the beginning of the 17th century “there was no word in ordinary usage which clearly expressed what we mean today by ‘method,’ a series of ordered steps gone through to produce with certain efficacy a desired effect—a routine of efficiency” (Ong 1968, 225).¹⁷ As used in education today, for example, the term “method” refers to a certain step-by-step routinization of teaching.¹⁸ Social institutions such as schools and disciplines, therefore, are largely created and sustained by words and the actions they initiate and coordinate.

This performative potential of some words and speech acts¹⁹ is particularly notable when dealing with abstract words. “Marriage” or “democracy,” for example, are ‘enacted’ or ‘created’ in and through particular words and situated actions that actualize one among an infinite number of possible realizations. Even where empirical givens are at stake, performative options allow variable instantiations. Thus, for example, “gender” cannot be reduced to biology. It also involves the particular performance of a social “role”²⁰ that is ‘created’ or ‘enacted’ differently according to societal influences, and even exhibits a notable range of variability between individuals within a particular society (e.g., Korsmeyer 2004²¹; Butler 1988). Many of the terms of educational discourse are especially rich in such performative potential, and variations in their use are further multiplied, magnified, and complicated by differences between languages.

Words also perform a “framing” function, one that elicits semantic networks of related concepts (Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 116-17)—associated conceptual baggage, subtexts, and connotations carried by words that unconsciously structure understanding and action. Framing is often affected by translating words from one language to another: even where a clear equivalent exists, the original frame is typically diminished by translation. For example, to translate *puu* (“tree”) from a language like Finnish to a language of a culture in which trees are a rarity misses the subtle yet significant framing of the word in just about any reference.²² And the typical English dictionary definition of “sauna”—one of many non-English words taken into common English use—as a “steam bath” altogether misses the framing of what in Scandinavia, the Nordic

countries, and Russia is truly a spiritual and social rite, a healing refreshment that is central to the ‘good life’ and, thus, a major feature in society.²³

The word “praxis,” though found in any English dictionary, is not commonly used in colloquial English. In contrast, in German colloquial use *Praxis* refers to the opposite of “theory” or “thinking.” Translating “praxis” (as English dictionaries do) as “practice”—as a routine habit—misses the important framing that accompanied its socio-ethical roots in ancient Greece (particularly as described by Aristotle): the ethical disposition (*phronesis*) of ‘right action’ undertaken in behalf of others and judged in terms of its benefits for them.²⁴

In German philosophy the term is often translated into English as “action.”²⁵ This frames the *intentionality*, the personal agency, of praxis²⁶—particularly in neo-Marxist philosophy and social theory—that focuses on praxis as creative and transformative for both individuals and society. Furthermore, particularly in critical theory, the traditional bifurcation of theory *and* praxis is subverted (e.g., Habermas 1973; see, also, n. 24 above). Praxis, then, is not seen as the application of theory (or its accumulated scholarship) to praxis; instead, *action and theory are fully interactive and interpenetrating*. Accordingly, theory and praxis are self-reflexively accountable in terms of both their historicity—the particular social conditions and needs that give rise to them—and the effects (for good or ill) of their performativity—the action-potential actually realized in praxis. Indeed, in this view, there is no such thing as ‘pure’ theory, no ‘value free’ silos of ‘objective’ findings: all theory, including in empirical science, involves some values and thus some ‘subjectivity’ that condition its creation. Furthermore, the kind of knowledge that can serve teaching praxis is not the kind generated by following the epistemological models of empirical science; it is generated in the decidedly contingent particulars of praxis itself—as action research, for example.²⁷

When theories of music—what it ‘is’, what it is ‘good for’—take contrasting praxial or aesthetic stances, then, frames start to collide. *Aesthetic* theories, especially those in the neo-Kantian, transcendental traditions inspired by the Enlightenment,²⁸ frame values associated with the philosophical term “aesthetic” and its concepts of ‘good taste’ (connoisseurship), separation of mind and body (intellect over sensuality), great ‘works’ (timeless genius), and with listening for (intellectual contemplation of) ‘purely musical meanings’ (immanent and unchanging) that

are thus ‘for their own sake’ (disinterested rather than useful).²⁹ *Praxial* theories, with their roots in social philosophy and other social theories and sciences, instead frame music as fundamentally social in its origins and uses, where its ‘goodness’ exists in terms of the various ‘goods’ it serves and where, therefore, the intentionality of its production and use are recognized, as are its immense potential for self-actualization and sociality—that is, its contribution to ‘creating’ both the individual and community.

These different frames for what music ‘is’ and is ‘good for’ thus hold considerably different potential when taken as bases of music education and severely complicate the possibilities of communicative rationality and scholarly discourse between the two views. However, as far as music education theory and research are concerned, the postulated aesthetic benefits of musical praxis, being by definition non-observable, at best can only be assumed.³⁰ In contrast, the praxial history and benefits of music pre-date the 18th century invention of aesthetic theory and its discourse³¹ and can be observed and studied empirically in daily life—people doing and using music—which is, again, what the sociology, social psychology, and anthropology of music (ethnomusicology, etc.) study (e.g., Martin 2006; DeNora 2003; Blaukopf 1992). As a result, the empirical benefits of praxial theories of music education are also easily researched, observed by teachers and students, and noted by parents and society. Nonetheless, terminology and tradition in different countries—for example in German and Germany—can almost reverse the references and frames, thus further complicating discourse about music and music education.³²

v.

Given the conditions and concerns outlined in the foregoing sections, the question remains whether music education research serves the epistemology of university research paradigms, and thus advances careers and disciplines and the reputations of universities, rather than the needs of teaching practice. If history is a guide, so-called ‘pure’ or ‘basic’ research sometimes finds its way into practice, but only to the degree that its narrow focus and supposed purity give way to always fluctuating pragmatic needs and criteria. In fact, the very *hypothesis* of regarding teaching practice as a two-step process—an undertaking in which, first, a supposed ‘knowledge

base' is developed by rigorous scientific means apart from practice and, then, teachers 'trained' to apply it as 'evidence-based' techniques or 'best practice' methods³³—is, by its very nature, seriously deficient and unproductive (Carr 2005; Dunne 2005; Kemmis 2005; Schwandt 2005). In any case, too much research in music education today seems to be either essentially irrelevant to teaching practice³⁴ or is addressed more to researcher peers more than to the kind of real-life problem-solving that is pertinent to music teachers and needed in music education today.³⁵

In relation to the needs of actual teachers, Stephen Kemmis (2005) takes note of a central aspect of the reflective practice paradigm of Donald Schön (e.g., 1987, 1983) that is based on Ernest Boyer's (1990) original distinction between "the scholarship of *discovery*, the scholarship of *application*, the scholarship of *integration*, and the scholarship of *teaching*" (Kemmis 2005, 395; italics original):

Schön argued that if universities are to really value other kinds of scholarship than the scholarship of discovery that underpins much university research, then they must find new ways of thinking about and valuing the knowledge inherent in the other forms of scholarship. He argued that universities have a particular kind of 'institutional epistemology' that causes them to prize the scholarship of discovery over other forms of scholarship, and that they need to develop different kinds of institutional epistemologies if they are properly to value the knowledge characteristic of other forms of scholarship" (394)

Thus, for Schön, "it is through the experiences and learned preference of individual academics that the existing institutional epistemologies of universities have become established, and it is therefore necessary to change the knowledge and experience of academics if we want to establish new institutional epistemologies supportive of practice knowledge" (395).

Kemmis is critical of Schön's emphasis on the *individual* reflective practitioner, however, for failing to include the many and vital "extra-individual aspects of practice."

[W]hat needs to be known is not just what is in the heads of other or past practitioners; it is also extra-individual: features that exist in discursive and social realms that extend beyond the heads of individuals into the space-time, historically-constituted and discursive realms they inhabit. (402).

Kemmis thus recommends "more open communication between universities and other sites and associations where practice is nurtured, sustained and developed; more open communication

about what is needed to develop practice in any particular place and time” (422). This requires researchers to leave their Ivory Towers and their university-predicated epistemologies of research, however, and to engage more directly with the situated problems of teachers and teaching (see, e.g., Rönnerman 2005).

For their part, instead of seeking one-size-fits-all, ‘how to’, ‘what works’ solutions to their teaching needs, teachers “should prepare themselves to engage in participatory, collaborative transformation of their practices in ways that anticipate and build solidarity among those participating in the discourse, and that anticipate and build legitimacy for the decisions they take in the endless critical task of transforming practices to meet the changing needs and changing circumstances of different times different people, and different places” (Kemmis 2005, 423). This disposition, in turn, should therefore be among the primary goals of pre- and in-service music teacher education.

To emphasize the point again, then, it is not a matter of putting ‘evidence-based’ theory *into* practice or of “privileging knowledge ‘in people’s heads’ ” (Kemmis 2005, 402) but of theory *and* practice understood as mutually reinforcing and collectively constituted. As Vakeva thus advises,

theory and practice are not separate: theorizing in music education—as in all education—is rooted in practice and gets its significance from its pragmatic consequences. This position of course, is commonplace in pragmatism: there is nothing so practical as a good theory. What may be more uncommon is the insistence that there is nothing so theoretical as a good practice—if, that is, theory is interpreted as a tool that helps practice to become more critical, and thus, more educative.

Notes

¹ Wacquant, in Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1993, 40, quoting (and translating) Bourdieu 1982, 10.

² E.g., see Rosen (2005), who thoroughly discredits “reception research,” the study of ever-changing sociocultural influences throughout history on listening praxis. In contrast, leading sociologists of music appreciate, correctly, that “aural experience includes something inaudible, a social frame that can’t be heard” (Korsyn 2003, 35) and thus study how and why people appropriate musical properties differently according to just such social and individual variables (see, e.g., Martin 2006; DeNora 2003). However, a major new history of music that dares offer a *social* history of music is critiqued by Rosen (2006) for the very attempt. Of course, the stance of seeking “music” (and thus its history) only in scores—what Rosen calls “literate music”

(2006, 41)—leaves out perhaps as much as 99 percent of all the music in the world. Too often, literate music is the “music” offered by music education, and its oft-stated goal of “music literacy” typically amounts at best to trying to teach students to read music. But, perhaps afraid of what will be learned, music education researchers do not seem to be much interested in whether most school graduates can read music to a functional level. In fact, despite the plethora of advocacy concerning the benefits of music education to society, very little has been done to research these putative benefits (see, e.g., Asmus n.d.); they are simply assumed.

³ In seeking to have its voice heard and heeded, each discipline engages in a form of competition with others to legitimate its existence and to advance its perspective (e.g., musicology vs. sociomusicology). Bourdieu (1990b) likens this competition to a ‘field of play’ in sports where the individual ‘players’ compete for attention, resources, and the like. Thus, various disciplines in music (and various musics) are in constant competition with each other for recognition, validation, and ascendancy (Korsyn 2003, 61-90); and music competes with other subjects for a place in schools and for the interest of students.

⁴ <http://www.maydaygroup.org/>

⁵ Or limited by jargon and other esoterica intelligible only to insiders.

⁶ See the Submission Policies on the ACT Home Page (<http://act.maydaygroup.org/>) and the Action Ideals on which those policies are based, <http://www.maydaygroup.org/php/actionideals.php>.

⁷ The occasional exception being an invited article by a recognized authority.

⁸ As Elliot notes, performance studies have been strongly influenced by theater arts. One result has been to extend the idea of stage performance to the ‘roles’ or ‘scripts’ enacted or ‘performed’ in everyday life, and to the ‘dramaturgical’ aspects of human interaction. For example, in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Erving Goffman (1959) devotes the entire opening chapter to “performance,” which he defines as “all the activity of an individual which occurs during a period marked by his [*sic*] continuous presence before a particular set of observers and which has some influence on the observers” (22). In this sociological view of what has been called ‘life as theater’, human action is given a dramaturgical component where the stage, its setting, the actor(s), the audience, and the result(s) created are all considered. In the present essay, references to “performance” and “performativity” emphasize aspects of this dramaturgical sociology and its related “dramaturgical knowledge”—i.e., “knowledge of how things unfold and how they may or may not unfold under different circumstances” (Kemmis 2005, 403-404).

⁹ Briefly: the physical properties of many objects “afford” or allow a variety of uses (e.g., a hammer as a nutcracker; a rock as a hammer), some of which rival the primary function associated with the object (e.g., a tennis ball as a dog toy; dance music or hymns just listened to). Hence, and in contrast to the traditional conceptions of music’s ‘for itself’ autonomy, the ‘given’ properties of music “afford” different possibilities that are taken, used or *appropriated* differently according to differences between listeners (or performers, or other ‘users’; e.g. a film director’s use of existing music) and the particulars of the situation—in particular, *why* they are listening (or performing, etc.) and thus *how*. Musicians strongly (and wrongly) tend to assume that their (professional, learned) manner of appropriation is the most or only “appropriate” way of dealing with the affordances of music.

¹⁰ From the point of view of ‘life as theater’, for example, it is the ‘performance’—the potential actually realized—unfolding over time, not the teaching certificate or the following of a lesson plan that ‘makes’ the “teacher.” In this view, “teachers” are any individuals from whom we learn, not a job description. Furthermore, a “classroom” is, in effect, a “stage” for (or created by) the ‘performances’ of teaching and learning (among other creations—such as for promoting the “deliberative democracy” described by Bladh & Heimonen in the article that follows). Considered in terms of performance studies, then, the “classroom” (including rehearsal rooms) and the “school” are dynamic ‘stages’ for living creation, not places where “pupils” are gathered as vessels to be filled with otherwise inert information or drilled with short-term skills that will not survive beyond the school years.

¹¹ This has occasioned the need for the retronym “self-discipline” since “discipline,” despite its roots in “*discipleship*,” is widely equated today with punishment, or enforced or coerced obedience.

¹² For example, many of the problems described in Elliott’s analysis but, in general, to an understanding of music education that extends well beyond ‘school music’.

¹³ Italics added. For Habermas, communicative rationality is governed by moral norms of equality and of ‘right results’ for those involved, and thus distinguishes the “praxis” of such rationality from the ‘instrumental’ or ‘strategic’ actions that are governed by technical rules (i.e., that treat people like ‘things’). This distinction is also discussed by Bladh & Heimonen since it has a major bearing on the considerable difference between teaching considered as praxis, and as a ‘strategy’ by which students are manipulated to learn what is imposed on them, or by which students are indoctrinated, even propagandized, brainwashed or ‘converted’ by schooling to (more or less mindlessly) accept certain political, religious, and social ideologies, rather than being *empowered* by schooling to think and choose for themselves. Music educators often take for granted that music education is properly the attempt to ‘convert’ students to ‘good music’, and critical theories of empowerment seek to identify and overcome just such strategic manipulation of students by empowering them to be the authors of their own histories of choosing. Critical theories also focus on the *empowerment of teachers* who, just as often as students, become either unwitting or unwilling functionaries of the strategic designs for schools of politicians, ideologues, and administrators; or who submit to what has been called the “de-skilling” of teaching as a result of adopting ‘teacher proof’ methods and materials. On “practitioner-proof” teaching, see Dunne 2005, especially pp. 375-376.

¹⁴ In societies like the U.S. where community music schools, as such, are quite rare, ‘voluntary’ music education can be understood in terms of both community music stores that offer lessons and private music studios offering group or individual lessons. Thus, the kind of communication urged by Bladh & Heimonen holds promise of a more comprehensive and effective relationship between *all* music educators in a community, not just those certified to teach ‘school music’.

¹⁵ For attempts to render these terms in English, see, e.g., Masschelein & Ricken 2003; Kertz-Welzel 2004.

¹⁶ This is not to be confused with creating physical reality. On the creation of social reality, see Searle 1995.

¹⁷ Walter J. Ong is a highly influential figure in communication theory, a field that, along with theater arts, has been a major source of influence on performance studies.

¹⁸ In particular, as a result of the “scientific management” movement in industry pioneered by industrial engineer and efficiency expert Frederick W. Taylor early in the 20th century. “Taylorism” was also applied to schools in the U.S. by the businesspeople who were elected to school boards. But its effects were felt worldwide, and it was largely responsible for a factory-like, assembly-line approach to schooling that focused on one-size-fits-all ‘methods’ of teaching in terms of their putative effectiveness and efficiency. Educators who concern themselves with finding ever-new ‘methods’ as newly improved, ‘what works’ technologies of teaching (e.g., “Whole Language,” “New Math,” etc.) continue this paradigm today and music educators are regularly pointed in such directions both by advocates of this or that ‘method’ and by professional organizations that promote ‘what works’ methodolatry in the guise of ‘best practices’ (see Regelski 2002).

¹⁹ Again, not all words or speech acts are performative or have that potential. For a précis of speech act theory in lay terms, see Crystal 2006, 276-281.

²⁰ “Role” (social role, role theory) is an important concept in sociology and social psychology and influences performance studies (e.g., via Goffman 1959). To begin with, a “role” identifies a certain social status (e.g., “boss” vs. “worker”), and it also ‘scripts’ general expectations (rights, responsibilities, standards, etc.) associated with a particular role by a society—so-called *role typifications*. “Teacher,” “student,” “mother” are all social roles, and—while typifications are too easily stereotyped—each role is performed differently by each person identified with (or who identifies with) that role. Role theory also highlights situations where the roles come into conflict: for example, when “mother” or “father” is also a “teacher” and needs to leave school to care for a sick child. Role typifications also evolve over time and the same typification in different cultures or societies may nonetheless carry considerably different expectations, status, etc.

²¹ Korsmeyer’s book, with essay-reviews of it by leading music educators, is featured in *Action, Criticism and Theory for Music Education*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2006): <http://www.maydaygroup.org/ACT/>.

²² People surrounded by trees have a variety of practical, conceptual, cultural, and emotional frames associated with trees—their use, their appeal, their role in everyday human life—and these frames do not accompany whatever stands for “tree” in cultures where trees are rare and, thus, where other frames exist.

²³ For example, new homes are typically built with a sauna; and even many modern apartments have them or share one. Every home supply company thus has a large section selling saunas and sauna accoutrements.

²⁴ ‘Goodness’ or ‘rightness’, then, is not attached to actions that *before the fact* are supposedly ‘good’ (or ‘good for’ others) but is seen in the *actual benefits* created. Therefore, ‘good methods’ cannot be stipulated in advance of their use; only in terms of the ‘goods’ thus promoted for students. This requires ‘theorizing’ about curriculum (i.e., What is most worth teaching?) in terms of observable benefits. Thus understood, *teaching engages both theory and praxis in interactive relation*: it is ‘reflective’ and ‘reflexive’ in terms both of theorized ‘goods’ (Were

results ‘good’, as theorized by curricular thinking?) and in evaluating the actions hypothesized as best for actualizing those ‘goods’ (To what degree was instruction successful in advancing hypothesized curricular ‘goods’?). Teaching, then, is not the ‘instrumental’ or ‘strategic’ adoption and implementation of a one-size-fits-all technicism of hand-me-down or prescriptive ‘methods’ (see Dunne 2005; Regelski 2002) but joins hands with the other helping professions (medicine, law, therapy, etc.) where praxis is suited to the needs of, and evaluated in terms of, the benefits for those served.

²⁵ This philosophical use honors the Aristotelian precedent of distinguishing “praxis” (actions or that serve *people* as guided by the ethical care-fullness of *phronesis*) from “techne” (skills for ‘making’ *things* well, or *poiesis*). However, in German colloquial use, where *Praxis* is basically the opposite of theory or abstract thought, this distinction is not observed, and *Praxis* also includes various forms of ‘making’ or production. As for the use of the term in scholarship, the references of sociomusicologist Kurt Blaukopf (1992) to *Praxis* are rendered into English by his translator, for example, simply as “practice” (see, e.g., 5-6), thus introducing a certain ambiguity between ‘things’ and ‘people’ that requires this explanation: “Rather than starting from music as a *work of art* . . . , it [the study of musical practice] takes as its point of departure music as a *social activity*, something older than notated music . . .” (5; italics added).

²⁶ As opposed to “practice,” which in English, as just mentioned, can be taken to refer to a more or less perfunctory habit rather than the care-fullness of the *phronimos* who acts with the ‘goods’ of those served always in mind. Accordingly, “teaching *practice*” and “teaching *praxis*,” are properly distinguished by the ethical care of the latter observed in serving the needs of students, *as judged in terms of the pragmatic benefits for them*—not according to the teacher’s authoritarian claims that “this is good for you because I say so” or to the use of supposedly ‘good methods’ that, as often as not, have negative results or fall short of effectively benefiting students. In distinction to such *authoritarian* teaching practice, Bladh & Heimonen argue in effect for teaching as praxis, where the ‘authority’ of a teacher is earned by being *authoritative*.

²⁷ Schwandt (2005) describes a relevant distinction between praxial knowledge and understanding (as situated, social, embodied, etc.) and the traditional ‘scientific’ conception of ‘pure’ knowledge (as ‘objective’, certain, universal, context-less, etc). His analysis shows that the latter kind of knowledge—no matter how specialized, ‘controlled’ or how or where accumulated—is most typically ill-suited to the actual needs of teachers. Dunne (2005) contrasts the “technical rationality” of much empirical research to the “practical rationality” and praxial knowledge needed for teaching praxis. For more on action research, see Rönnerman 2005, and Regelski 1994-95; but compare to Carr 2005, who is critical of action research that is conducted in the spirit of teaching as a technology (338).

²⁸ The 18th century Enlightenment created the concept and discourse of aesthetics by giving the Greek *aisthesis*—knowledge gained by the senses—a new meaning framed by the rationalism and science of the age. Today, typical references to “aesthetic experience” tend to refer mainly to certain sensory experiences framed with 18th and 19th century connotations of “beauty” and “good taste” that infer pleasurable sensory knowledge that (somehow) rises above mere sensual gratification. As no less an authority than Rosen admits, “the word ‘aesthetic’ does not exist before the eighteenth century, so no one before that time could speak of ‘aesthetic experience’:

the terms traditionally employed were ‘pleasure’ and ‘delight’ (2006, 44).” However, “pleasure” and “delight” involve frames that fall considerably short of the noble sounding transcendental claims of profundity made by much aesthetic theory in the name of “aesthetic experience,” and certainly much more than “pleasure” and “delight” are claimed for music education conceived as aesthetic education.

²⁹ Aesthetic theory is almost devoid of theorizing concerning the role of the performer and, thus, the role of performance. In contrast, the essence of *performance art* in the visual arts is its performativity. Only recently have some scholars started to understand music itself in performative terms. For an analysis of the issue, see Cook 2003 (also, see Cook quoted earlier in section iii in connection with Elliott’s article).

³⁰ Given the private nature of aesthetic experience that aestheticians theorize, there is no possibility of rigorous empirical evidence that students have profited “aesthetically” from instruction. If the *impact of instruction on the actual musical choices* of students outside of school and later in life is taken as empirical evidence of ‘appreciation’, the effectiveness of much of ‘school music’ must be called into question. The disconnection of ‘school music’ from real life parallels the disconnection of traditional aesthetic concepts of music from everyday life—i.e., music is said to be ‘above’ the ordinary and thus as reserved for rare and special moments—and increasingly leaves music education as an institution vulnerable to less and less public recognition and support. The first four articles in this issue address the need to reconnect music education and society, with Vakeva, in particular, explicating the pragmatic alternative of Dewey’s philosophy of art and music to traditional aesthetic theorizing.

³¹ See Rosen 2006, 44 (quoted in n. 28 above).

³² In Germany, then, “*ästhetische Erziehung*” (“aesthetic education”) refers to something quite different than “music education as aesthetic education” does in North America. The German term remains closer to the original Greek “*aisthesis*” in referring broadly to educating the senses (all of them) for the benefit of the kind of heightened everyday experience Vakeva describes in his article. In this understanding, ‘beauty’ is a matter of why and how people ‘use’ art (but also other ‘things’) in enhancing life, in contrast to relying exclusively on “great works” of the classical canon. Thanks to Jürgen Vogt and Wilfried Gruhn for their help (private communications) in recognizing and clarifying this distinction.

³³ See, e.g., <http://www.stepspd.org/> for an example that claims a scientific universality for its ‘methods’ despite differences between countries and, apparently, even subject matter, age-group and other variables. In music education, similar one-size-fits-all, supposedly universal ‘methods’ exist that claim to be research-based, while others are promoted on an ‘it works’ premise. Even so-called ‘evidence-based’ medical practice (i.e., *praxis*) is not as straightforward as is often assumed (see, e.g., Gorman 2007): “Medicine, after all, is a personalized service, one built around the uniqueness of each patient and the skilled physician’s ability to design care accordingly” (37).

³⁴ The situation brings to mind the Sufi teaching story about the futility of the whimsical cleric Nasrudin who found it easier to look for his lost coin in a lighted area rather than in the dark where he lost it. It is the dark and shadowy realms of teaching that need to be illuminated, not what is easy to research.

³⁵ And ‘pure’ research for its own sake is, at best, an arguable virtue in any teaching field and, at worst, is ill-afforded when more pressing, down-to-earth needs are at stake. The apologia that such ‘findings’ accumulate until “someday” a theory emerges is at once wishful thinking, serving to legitimate such research in the absence of other unequivocal benefits and also a naive and outdated philosophy of science—particularly concerning the contemporary philosophy of social science research (see, e.g., Rosenau 1992; Delanty 1999; Little 2001; Bourdieu 2004) which governs most empirical educational research. It rests, erroneously, on the two-step hypothesis (mentioned above) of ‘evidence-based’ practice and ‘teacher training’ that, by itself, is an unrealistic model for improving teaching. This topic cannot be pursued further here but, as regards music education, see, e.g., Regelski 1996.

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