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To The Reader

This inaugural issue of *Action, Theory and Criticism for Music Education* is devoted to papers presented at the interdisciplinary colloquium held June 11-15, 2000 in Helsinki Finland by the “MayDay Group” of musicians (MDG) and the “Artist, Work of Art, and Experience” group of artists (AWE). These proceedings were originally published in the *Finnish Journal of Music Education (Musikkikasvatus)*, Vol. 5, No. 1-2 (2000). With the permission of that journal, they are now made accessible to the international community of music education scholars. Two lectures by Professor Richard Shusterman, a leading pragmatist philosopher who has concerned himself centrally with the arts, were arranged by AWE to coincide with the colloquium and produced two interviews by Lauri Väkevä of the University of Oulu, Finland, the second of which is published here for the first time. Thanks are offered to Professor Shusterman for his contribution to the colloquium and for granting permission to publish the interviews.

By way of background, the MayDay Group (www.maydaygroup.org) is a group of international scholars from a variety of disciplines in music and music education. J. Terry Gates, SUNY Buffalo and Thomas A. Regelski, SUNY Fredonia (both now emeritus) created the group in 1993 to consider mounting challenges facing music educators and the status of music in society. Its analytical agenda is to interrogate traditional and status quo conceptions of music and music education from the perspectives of critical theory, critical thinking and research from all relevant disciplines. Its positive agenda is to inspire and promote action for change, both concerning how music and musical value are understood in the contemporary world of music and in the institutions responsible for music in society, particularly music education. The AWE Group (<http://triad.kiasma.fng.fi/awe/WRITINGS/index.html>) includes artists from several disciplines associated with several art schools and universities in Finland who share mutual interest in applying Pragmatism to important issues in art and art theory. Finnish philosopher Pentti Määttänen, a specialist in John Dewey and Charles S. Pierce, has been informal leader of this group.

MayDay colloquia are held once or twice a year, and each explores one of the seven “action ideals” posted on the Group’s website. The Helsinki meeting focused on Ideal Five: “In order to be effective, music educators must establish and maintain contact with ideas and people from other disciplines.” A joint meeting with artists was, therefore, very apt and produced much of mutual value. As a prelude to the colloquium, Professor Claire Detels, a musicologist at the University of Arkansas and a MDG member, agreed to produce a “study paper.” This was drawn directly from her book *Soft Boundaries: Re-Visioning the Arts and Aesthetics in American Education* (Bergin and Garvey Publishers, 1999), a critique of how single-disciplinary specialization and scholarly and pedagogical insularity within and between art and music departments of universities and schools have produced negative consequences for the effectiveness of arts and music education. The study paper was not read at the colloquium; but because it was addressed directly by several papers and other participants, it is also included with the proceedings.

Given the commitment of the AWE group to pragmatism and a strong interest on the part of several MDG members in music and music education as *praxis*, a Pragmatist theme evolved that addressed distinctly post-modern, post-analytic and post-structuralist perspectives on art, music and music education. In contrast to the hegemony of modernist aestheticist accounts of art, music and music education, the pragmatist-praxial tone of these proceedings exemplified for the arts a trend in other disciplines that has recently been called “the practice turn.”* In contrast to the “linguistic turn” of analytic, common language and formal language philosophy that occurred early in the 20th century, this newly burgeoning *practice theory* is concerned with human actions that are organized around praxis and pragmatic values, and that involve shared and embodied understanding, skills and know-how—where, in short, meaning arises in situated conditions of use.

Heidegger, Wittgenstein and a wide array of notable post-analytic, post-modern and post-structuralist philosophers, as well as second-generation critical theorists such as Habermas, have influenced the growth and direction of practice theory. It incorporates recent social philosophy and cultural theory and, in distinction to the rationalist bias of analytic theory, draws on empirical findings from the social sciences and cognitive studies, including neuroscience and consciousness research. The relevance for the arts and for music and music education in particular of this new emphasis on embodied praxis should be obvious; at the very least it offers the promise of new directions for thinking and research regarding the challenges facing music education. Thus, this collection of papers presents a variety of fresh and sometimes competing perspectives that otherwise have been overlooked, minimized, or even denied in many status quo discussions of music and music education. This new and sometimes provocative research is offered in keeping with the MayDay Group’s agenda to facilitate and disseminate new ideas, to continue to promote analysis of and open-minded dialogue about both old and new ideas, and to help effect change for the betterment of music education and music in society.

* Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina and Eike Von Savigny, eds. *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*. Routledge: 2001.

Thomas A. Regelski, Editor.



Naturalizing Philosophy of Music Education


A Provocation for June 2000 MayDay Meeting at Helsinki

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It seems that in the contemporary postanalytic philosophical situation, we could use a revitalized naturalized concept of philosophy of music education. This concept should take seriously the findings of contemporary cognitive research, as well as pay attention to the “semantic tradition”, which frames our discourse about music and experience. In the following, I suggest, in a very general level, how the epistemological basis for music education could be developed from a naturalist pragmatic standpoint.

1. At least since the late 1970's, there has appeared growing distress as to the outlook analytic philosophers have on important educational questions. However, the alternatives offered for positivist-empiricist philosophizing has not proven to be that promising, either.

 On one hand, the postmodernist or “postpositivist”¹ positions introduce serious epistemological problems with their relativist and/or politicist dispositions; on the other  hand, the “historicists”² have succeeded to uncover matters mostly of academic interest.

From the educational standpoint, the disenchantment to the postmodern strategies makes perfect sense. Western educational thought is still more or less based on the ideas of Enlightenment, which did not consider education as a multivalued web of discourses, but as a rational enterprise aiming for the common good (e.g., for the formation of a “civilized” members of a society). Even if the ideals of rationality have been repeatedly shown the door in the postmodern debates, they keep coming back, because our educational system is still  thoroughly based on modern ideas.³ This may even be specifically the case with the Western music education (see e.g., Small 1977; 1998; Regelski 1996).

It seems to me that many of the present problems in the philosophy of music education reflect a more general-level dilemma in general educational thought. We still lack a way of philosophing, which could provide a sound (pun unintended) basis for a *pedagogical* line of thinking of music education. By “pedagogical” I do not just mean that this philosophy would just deal with music in connection to instructional matters. Rather, I would welcome a more systematic viewpoint to the ways musical situations can be transformed into educative experiences (see also Väkevä 2000). However, I am ready to admit that this approach can no more lean (solely) on Enlightenment ideals. We need a position, which is strong enough to cope with the postmodern world of constant change, but still preserve the gist of modern educational thinking.

2. My thesis is that this kind of a position has already been suggested, though neglected for decades. It can be traced back over a century to the philosophy of John Dewey. A similar notion has been recently proposed by Jerome A. Popp who, following the developments of several scholars in the fields of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science (e.g., Kitcher 1992; Stich 1990, Laudan 1996), puts forth a Deweyan “naturalized” program in educational philosophy to substitute the “empiricist” and “relativist” approaches.⁴

In general philosophy (e.g., Stuhr 1993), as well as in philosophy of education (e.g., Garrison 1993), there has recently appeared a vital new line of discussion of Dewey’s work. This discussion seems to be emerging from the heart of the current philosophical situation, as more and more scholars pay attention to the affinities between pragmatic-preanalytic and postanalytic ideas. There has also appeared a tendency to revitalize pragmatic ideas in the contemporary philosophy of music education. Probably more than others, the praxial philosophers of music education have connected pragmatists’ notions of meaning and action to the views emerging from the “new” philosophical discourse of music.

I am not claiming that the praxial philosophies merely present us pragmatic ideas in new clothes. However, as I have argued before (Väkevä 1999), I do think that there can be found a pragmatic rationale, at times explicit but often implicit, behind many of the central ideas developed within the praxial discourse.⁵ Furthermore, it appears to me that this pragmatic potential could be explicated and put into use in formulation of a general pragmatic-pedagogical view on philosophy of music education. Moreover, I think that Dewey's visions could provide a conceptual frame of reference, upon which this view can be reflected.

What, then, could be the arguments in favor of adopting a Deweyan pragmatic naturalist approach in music education? Do we really have a need for a naturalized program in order to formulate philosophical standpoints of what appears to be a culture-relative and practical ingredient of human life? Surely, as Scruton (1999, 16-17) puts it, as far as we know, "music is not a natural kind", but a matter of distinctly human contribution?

Like all philosophical alternatives, we can hold our philosophical approach as strong as its epistemological footing. Even if we do not accept the traditional foundationalist terms, it is evident that – unless we subscribe to cultural relativism – *some* kind of justification is needed for at least *some* kind of a general and acceptable scheme of how we can know and become knowledgeable. One problem with contemporary naturalism is that there is no such view as *the* naturalist epistemology, even if there are obvious similarities between its different subbranches (Laudan 1996, 155).⁶ In order to choose from these, we could follow the way of pragmatists; we could begin by weighing the options at hand in relation to our problem and see where they lead us in theoretical, as well as in practical terms. However, this analysis must wait for another occasion.⁷ Here a heuristic lookout must suffice.

3. In Claire Detels' study paper for the present colloquium, the integration problem of the Ideal No 5. is formulated as a concern of how to soften the artificial boundaries between music education and other disciplines. Detels' commentary centers on this problem from the standpoint of interdisciplinary education in arts, with an eye for aesthetics and aesthetic education as the foundation links between various art subjects.⁸ Detels argues that more than just presenting our pupils musical things to do, we should teach them "how and why we hear, feel, think and create in music and other sensory experiences" (ibid.). Moreover, all arts should be seen as presenting us "communally shared creative responses to human experience" (ibid.). The communality of these responses should guarantee that general music education can remain as truly general.

To me, Detels' arguments bring back certain central themes of Dewey's aesthetics. These themes hold certain epistemological underpinnings, which could illuminate the need of a naturalist position in understanding how we can be knowledgeable of, as well as in music. The suggested position reminds us that the common substance of the arts is not to be found in artistic objects (or events), but within *experience*.⁹ We do not just experience things that we hold as art; at root, art *is* experiencing, an ideal way of transforming the sensory (sentient) aspect of our transactional relationships with the natural environment into relationships possessing cultural significance.¹⁰

For Dewey, the aspect of what Detels calls "sensory imagery" is always present in aesthetic experience, including the experiences that involve art objects (see also Holder 1993; Jackson 1998, 27-28).¹¹ However, these sensory images do not represent any transcendental forms of any ideal (or symbolic) order; at root, they express the dynamics of our corporeal embeddedness in the physiological-natural environment, what Dewey calls the "enduring background of nature and human life" (LW 10, 241; see also Holder 1993). This background works as the material basis for all experiencing and thus should be

conceived as the only plausible starting-point (though by no means not an end) for naturalist explanations of musical experiencing, as well.

According to Dewey, artistic form is developed within natural experiential relations, as the work of art is developed as *an* experience (see LW 10, chs. 2 and 6). This involves signification¹², transformation of the things-at-hand into things-of-purpose. Because the basic *telos* of all experiencing is signification, art, as experience, is always about more than what Detels calls “sharing the expressive aspect of life through the perceivable media”. Artistic-aesthetic experience is an active cultural relationship, where we try to grasp the full meaning of our encounters with the things within our life-world in relation to our pragmatic purposes. This also means that such experiencing is always situational, or contextual, and the context partly determines how we use art to transform our life-world into one of significance. In other words, although there is a general (maybe even universal, but *not* transcendental) aesthetic level in our dealings with art, we always experience art within our more or less differentiated life-practices, and this necessarily affects the ways our experiences evolve.

Thus, we end with a picture of art situated in the continuum of subjective (basically corporeal) and sociocultural (or sociopragmatic) realms of experience. This implies a multileveled concept of experiencing. Following Määttänen (1993, 51) and Dewey (LW 1, 208), we could talk about experience as being “laminated” of layers, or “plateaus” possessing increasing complexity and mediated by signification.¹³ Art objects, like other objects that hold potential significance for us, enter into our life at the threshold of the transformation process, which help us to take grasp of the situations we are embedded in and turn them into assets of meaningful living. The latter refers to the naturally developed and self-evolving program, which help us to recreate our lives on individual, as well as on social level. Another term for this program is *culture*: following Dewey (see LW 1, 361-

364), as well as certain contemporary cultural psychologists (see Boesch 1991; Fuhrer 1993; Lang 1993), we could say that human experience is a way of actualizing the potentials of our natural environment into means of living, in which the way we are situated within the natural system is transformed into ways for inhabiting it within the cultural system(s).

This discussion takes us to the heart of the naturalist epistemology. For Dewey, to really experience is to make things significant, which is the same as to *know* them and more than to just *feel, or share* them (however, the latter are also preserved throughout the experience). Moreover, there is an artistic, as well as aesthetic side in all signification. Art does not merely imitate life or vice versa: art is situated at the center of what it is to live meaningfully. Art is experience at its most constructive mode. In our artistic dealings we do not just produce and behold the expressive intrinsic qualities of what are culturally held as objects of art, but construct the work of art as *an* experience, which educates us in and of the basic terms of our experiencing. In this and in the very basic sense, an artistic experience is also an educative experience (see Jackson 1998, 5-6).

To Dewey, the crux of all experiencing is found in the way we deal with problems, as they present themselves in different guises in different situations. It is a matter of *inquiry* (understood again in Deweyan way)¹⁴ to sort out these problems sensitive to the context, and the way this process of inquiry develops can possess more or less aesthetic quality. The logic of “art-centered aesthetic experiences”¹⁵ does not differ from the logic of other experiences. It has to do with the way the terms of inquiry are fulfilled, and the way they “prepare [us] for later experiences of a deeper and more expansive quality” (LW 13, 28). Thus, also in all aesthetic experiencing, a process takes place, in which some indeterminate situation is transformed into a determinate situation (LW 12, 108). This process is going on continually, as “our bodies are...solving endless problems of their...sustained existence” (Ryan 1995, 28). It is based on a constant interaction between reflecting agents and their

environmental conditions where alternating phases of doing and undergoing produce signifying cognitive results guiding future action. In the realm of cultural life (the third “plateau”), this – basically natural – process of signifying is utilized in service of social ends. Put in combined Deweyan and Heideggerian terms, as cultural beings we formulate meaning in order to cope with the nature, as well as to understand our being-in-the-world in the shared, sociocultural realm where we find ourselves as selves.¹⁶ Art is no exception in this respect: at root, we do and enjoy art in order to understand and live meaningfully.

It is not my intention to turn this discussion into a profound analysis of the ideas of Dewey’s (or Heidegger’s) pragmatism. Hence, I am not going to delve deeper than needed into Dewey’s theory of art as experience, for which I have more time in my AWE-session. However, this short deviation into Dewey’s thought serves to remind us that “traditional” naturalism quite naturally employs a multileveled (but not dualist!) approach to the human epistemology, in which the bottom-up-approach of natural sciences can be combined with the top-down-approach of cultural sciences.¹⁷ If we want to understand experience, we need to understand it from both sides. Of course, to a naturalist, these approaches are not equal in genetic terms (we are still basically social animals), but they are mutually important in order to grasp human life as *we know it*. This goes also with understanding musical experience and the way it could be turned into an educative experience.

4. Following Popp and others, I suggest that one way to dispose of the epistemological riddles of empiricism and relativism¹⁸ could be by revitalizing Dewey’s holistic program with its cultural naturalist epistemology, and by following its guiding ideas concerning the nature of human knowledge and its role in human experience, including musical experience. This way we could also get rid of some of the most difficult contradictions in our field, including the present problem of demarcation, which, at worst, forces us to rationalize the

special significance of music with semi-transcendental (or just plain *ad hoc*) justifications of musical value. Moreover, it could help us to put forth a truly pluralist (but not relativist) program of music education, suggested already by Small (1977), and developed further in the discourses, which generally find the gist of music education in signifying musical transactions within cultural settings.

Were we to follow this line, we should concentrate at least on two main lines of inquiry in order to clarify what music could mean in pedagogical terms. First, if we take seriously the claim for pragmatic naturalist primacy as the only undoubtable *a priori*, we should pay serious attention to the results of contemporary science, especially to those of the cognitive (including sociocognitive) sciences. These, combined with a sound naturalist epistemology, tell us how knowledge in, of and about music is constructed for the pragmatic needs of human life. This line of inquiry would basically follow Dewey's instrumentalist program of inducing from empirical data "the distinctive traits of situations within which the function of thought begins and eventually ends" (Thayer 1981, 170). The basic aim of this line of study is to clarify the fundamental naturalist logic of the experiential situation, which works as the basis for all meaning formation.

The second project, mostly still ahead of us, would be to make visible the "intellectual history" of knowing in, of and about music. In other words, we should produce a contributory description of music's role in signifying life-processes by writing a *natural* history of music. Another, closely related project would be to try to understand the ways people have "musicked" (Small 1998, 9) in different phases of their history, that is, to write a *cultural* history (or histories)¹⁹ of music. From the standpoint of traditional naturalism, these projects are understood as continuous, but the latter cannot be reduced to the first. The former clarifies us, *why* people enjoy what we understand as music, the latter *how* and *in what terms* they have enjoyed it.

Still another subproject, important but by no means primary, would be to find out how the use of the concepts denoting what we call “music” has varied in history and varies at present. However, this approach is more important in making us knowledgeable of the roots of the present scholarly and indigenous ways of arguing of and about music than in helping us understand how people know music and come to live musical lives. Thus, it does not suffice as a means of meta-analysis of a philosophy of music or music education. The linguistical distinctions we use in order to get a grip of what we are doing tell us nothing of the “whys” or “hows” of our doings. The real distinctions are pragmatic, related to signifying actions, in which the materials that develop into musical experience are put in use and objectified as music. As such, musical significant action cannot really be detached from other signifying actions. The “reasons for” music are entangled to complicated webs of reasons and purposes that we weave in order to make sense of our experiences. Even if there are, at root, natural explanations even for our most seemingly useless practices, the way we transform the natural conditions of experience to conditions of growth vary with other cultural practices.

The demarcation problem expressed in the Ideal No. 5 could be made transparent by assuming a naturalist point of view, which follows Dewey in holding that all arts have common substance in the “general conditions without which an experience is not possible” (LW 10, 217). Also, like Dewey (ibid. 217-218) put it, all arts can be conceived as means of communication, the latter meaning here participation in shared formation of meaning. There is no substantial difference between the ways we transform meaning within experience. Arts, music included, make up an important part of living meaningfully; in order to understand how this can be accomplished in educational terms, we have to know why and how this takes place.

Notes

¹ I use the term "postpositivist" here in a very general manner, as referring to a diversity of positions, which since the early 1960's have tried to formulate options for (1) positivist-foundationalist epistemology, (2) referentialist philosophy of language, and (3) atomistic-reductionistic ontology. (see e.g., Laudan 1996, ch. 1; Murphy 1997, ch. 1; Popp 1998, ch. 1.)

² By "historicists" I refer to those educational philosophers, who are more into systematic analysis and reevaluation of the arguments of authorities of educational thought, rather than into analysis of educational concepts, or into postmodern deconstruction of educational ideals. The representatives of continental hermeneutical tradition (emanating from Dilthey) can be provisionally counted in this category.

³ For instance, one of the most visible retro-rationalists in the educational field, Harvey Siegel has tried to save the Enlightenment ideals by connecting the educational values of rationality with the development of critical abilities.

⁴ Popp (1998, 45ff., 71-76) does not share the view of "reductionist" naturalists, who want to eliminate non-scientific explanations from philosophical inquiry of knowledge and human thinking. Rather, referring to his approach as "traditional" naturalism, he urges us to reinvigorate the epistemological and ontological premises of educational philosophy by combining the naturalistic bottom-up position of the contemporary science with sociocultural-historical top-down-approaches of the humanities. A similar kind of an approach has been suggested by Jerome Bruner (1990), who wants to withhold cultural analysis as a part of psychological research in education. The point is that our "semantic endowment" should not be kept apart from understanding the educational field (see Popp 1998, 48). Of course, this is also the point classical pragmatists share with the main figures of 20th century continental pedagogy. For the "temperate" versions of naturalism, see also Määttänen (1993, 1995); Pihlström (1995).

⁵ I also think that pragmatic sources have – to a degree – influenced contemporary non-praxial writers (like Bennett Reimer) and that some thematic similarities could be found between present Anglo-American philosophies in our field within a more extensive pragmatic frame of reference (see also Spychiger 1997; Väkevä & Ojala 1999).

⁶ One of these similarities is the conception of natural a priori, according which there is no super- or extranatural foundation, in which our grasp of the world (and ourselves within it) is based; all problems, philosophical and other, are empirical (Määttänen 1995). However, this does not entail a reductionist epistemology: pragmatic naturalist approach has to be developmental (or genetic), but not eliminative (see Pihlström 1995).

⁷ When the time is ripe for this kind of an analysis, I think that one of the basic tasks is to find a way between "temperate" and reductionist naturalisms. Do we accept different epistemologically justified levels of explanation, a choice, which must be constantly alert to relativists' difficult claims for the equality of different world-views, or do we settle for some kind of common-sense naturalist foundationalism, which obtains a basic trust to the natural processes by which we come to justified beliefs of the nature, as well as a basic trust to the

successfulness of scientific methodology (this kind of a naturalism is suggested e.g., by Lammenranta [1993])? In the field of music education, the choice holds evident implications to the way we conceive musical experience and make our decisions about the proper subject matter of our teaching. For instance, can we have knowledge of music as such? *Is* there music as such, or do we construct music in our cognitive processes? If so, is musical meaning not subjective? If this is so, how can we explain the different culturally shared ways of perceiving musically intended sound? Do the musics of the world have something in common independently of our culture-specific ways of discussing about them? Should we aim for an analysis of the knowledge of this kind, or settle for subjective knowledge in music? If we do not want to restrict ourselves to edifying discussions about what we could mean by discussing about music and music education, we really need a convincing epistemology of both.

⁸ Detels does not refer to "aesthetics" in the sense of 18th century-originated aesthetics of transcendental beauty, but as the Kantian "experiential and intellectual key" to the sensory realm.

⁹ To Dewey (see e.g., LW 10, 25; LW 13, 17-30), experience is just not about a perceiving subject detecting the world. Rather, the term covers the organic whole of transactional relationships between a natural organism and its environment. To see experience as transactional is to examine it from a holistic point of view, as a system of numerous interactions where there cannot be drawn clear line between subject and object, agent and field of action, knower and the known. The term "transactional" is used by Dewey and Bentley (in Dewey LW 16, 66-68, 96-97) as an indication of the procedure of examining epistemological categories holistically. The purpose of the term is to remind that all human action takes place "as processes of the full situation of organism-environment" (ibid. 97). See (ibid. 101) for a history of this concept in Dewey's thought.

¹⁰ There is no room here to deal with Dewey's conception of the sentience. See e.g., Tiles (1988, chs. 2-3) for the development of his notion of sense and feeling in experience. See also the discussion of emotion and experience in (LW 10, ch. 2).

¹¹ It should be remembered that for Dewey, the realm of aesthetic is much larger than the realm of artistic experiencing. In *Experience and Nature* (LW 1, 26), Dewey makes a distinction between artistic and aesthetic experience; their difference is "not one of words but of objects". However, I think that he makes this distinction not because he holds artistic and aesthetic as substantially different kinds of experiences, but because he wants to emphasize that the realm of aesthetic does not just concern perception of (fine) art. For Dewey, there is an artistic aspect in every experience taken to its fulfillment; art "represents the culminating event of nature as well as the climax of experience" (ibid. 8). When experiencing in a way that one has *an* experience, one always assumes – at least to a certain degree – both artist's (or artisan's) and esthetic perceiver's role. Also, in *Art as Experience* (LW 10, 53), Dewey regrets that the English language is lacking a word that covers both active and undergoing aspects of artistic-esthetic experiencing (there is a lack of such word also in the Finnish language). The point is here to note that at root, aesthetic and artistic mode of experiencing are sides of the same coin. It is only within a cultural setting, which values artistic products separated from their contexts of use that this distinction applies (see also Small 1977). Indeed, the whole concept of artistic design as the substantial work of art is highly suspicious in light of the transactional approach, as Dewey also makes clear.

¹² Basically, this refers to organic processes of meaning-formation, which take place through the formation of generalized habits in order to cope with changes in the environment (see Tiles 1988, ch. 2), but in human life (and possibly in the lives of other higher animals) this meaning-formation is developed into modes of communication, by which we are able to share the fruits of our signification and turn our necessities into commodities.

¹³ According to Dewey (LW1, 208) three such plateaus can be discriminated. The first is physical, and its properties define "matter as a general character". The second is that of "life", and presents qualitative differences which define the "psycho-psychical". The third is that of "association, communication, participation" and presents "mind as intellect; possession and response of meanings" (ibid.). The upper plateaus are not in reality distinct, but continuous with and emergent from the naturalist processes. For more about Dewey's concept of the emergence of mind, see the discussion in Tiles (1988, ch. 4). See also Holder (1993).

¹⁴ It is not necessary to go into the details of Dewey's thoughts on inquiry, as the concept is widely known. For a closer look, see Dewey's *Logic* (LW 12, esp. ch. 6)

¹⁵ According to Jackson (1998, 35) Dewey more suggests than makes explicit the distinction between general aesthetic experiences and "art-centered experiences". The latter involve art objects, purposeful designs with which "the enjoyment derived from them...is intimately connected" (ibid.).

¹⁶ Like Heidegger, Dewey suggests that takes place within linguistical realm. However, language, for Dewey, denotes in a very extensive sense "the medium, in which culture exists and through which it is transmitted" (LW 12, 27). Culture, understood as consisting of the ways the experiential transactions with (and within) nature are applied into social uses, is thus a prerequisite for symbolic use. In developmental terms, symbolic practices come of being through the use of natural kinds in pragmatic purposes. (See e.g., Dewey MW 9, 18-19; LW 12, ch. 3; Määttänen 1993, ch. 11).

¹⁷ An important thing to remember is that in Dewey's account, the quality of the "background" is preserved throughout the process of inquiry. It is this property that provides an esthetic experience its emotional (and satisfying) tone. However, there are no emotions or any generalized feelings in the artistic objects or events themselves: the "secondary" emotions (distinct feelings) are functions of the "primary" emotions of the experiential situation, the sense of the whole reflecting the subjective unity of organism's responses (see LW 19, 48-50; Tiles 1988, 60).

¹⁸ According to Laudan (1996, ch. 1), empiricist and relativist standpoints actually follow the same problematic epistemic presuppositions, which make the latter more an "end-game" than an alternative for the former, and this is the most prominent reason for the need of formulating a credible naturalist epistemology. Among the presuppositions Laudan finds problematic in both empiricist and relativist standpoints are (1) the translation thesis, which holds that different disciplines produce their theories in different languages which are, between themselves, more or less incommensurable; (2) the thesis of methodological

subjectivism, according which there are no ways to bring methodological disputes into rational closure; (3) the thesis of need for algorithmic decision rules, which holds that rationality and objectivity of theory decision requires the existence of universal rules; (4) the underdetermination thesis, according which theories can not be derived from a finite body of evidence, or numerous theories are logically compatible with any body of evidence; (5) the cumulativity/progress thesis, which holds that theory change is cumulative or content-retaining; and (6) the anti-demarcation thesis, which states that science is not marked as a way of knowing from other forms of belief. The real problem lies in attempts to fit these presuppositions together in the postmodern context. Following Popp (1998, 7), we can point out one practical consequence of the relativist confusions attached to these presuppositions in that there is presently growing a generation of educational graduate students who have "been led to that there are no theories of learning or teaching" by "professors who believe that teachers can be prepared through a process of pooled, anecdotal stories generated by collections of assorted personal histories". Thus, Popp (ibid. 8) argues that "philosophy of education in postanalytic period...must place even greater epistemological demands on itself than it did during the analytic period".

¹⁹ A major problem here is, of course, that this history has obtained different forms in different settings. Also, as Walker (1996) has pointed out, we still have to solve the ethnomusicologist's "emic/etic"-problem in approaching the "musics" of different cultures.

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